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1. Introduction 
We explore a new channel in corporate risk management literature through which firms could create 
value and reduce risk by considering the following questions: How far ahead do firms hedge? What 
are the determinants of the maturity structure of firms’ hedging programs? What are the economic 
effects of hedging maturities on firm value and risk? These questions are still largely unexplored 
because of the lack of empirical analysis due to limitations of the data. Using an extensive and new 
hand-collected dataset on the risk management activities of 150 U.S. oil and gas producers with 
quarterly observations over the period 1998-2010, we fill this gap in the literature and answer the 
above questions. It is important to understand why firms within the same industry and with the same 
risk exposure differ in terms of their hedging maturity structure.  
We contribute to the literature on corporate hedging in several ways. Our first contribution is to 
provide empirical evidence of the rationales and determinants of the maturity structure of hedging 
contracts at inception; we also study the rationales for early termination of hedging contracts, and the 
real implications of maturity choice on firm value and risk. We hence add new significant results to 
the empirical literature; the scant empirical studies discuss the maturity structure of hedging in a 
largely descriptive manner.1 In addition, our data collected from publicly disclosed information avoid 
                                                            
1 Dolde (1993) surveys the hedging practices of 244 Fortune 500 companies and finds that the common practice is to hedge cash flow 
exposures within a horizon of two to four quarters. In line with Dolde (1993), Tufano (1996) provides statistics about the percentage of 
the production hedged for North American gold mining firms for 1991-1993, and finds that they hedge 61.2% of their gold production 
for the current year (1991) and 10% and 11% for the subsequent two years. In a Wharton survey of financial risk management practices 
and derivatives of 399 U.S. non-financial firms, Bodnar et al (1998) report that 82% of the questioned firms use foreign currency 
derivatives with an initial maturity of 91 days or less, and only 12% use foreign currency derivatives with maturities exceeding 3 years. 
They also find that hedging ratios at longer maturities decreased dramatically during 1998. Adam and Fernando (2006 and 2008) study 
the cash flow gains from selective hedging for a sample of 92 North American gold producers from 1989 to 1999 and report descriptive 
statistics of hedging ratios up to five years. They find that gold producers use hedging programs with one-year maturities in 90% of 
firm-quarters with non-zero hedging with a mean hedging ratio of 54% of expected gold production, hedging programs with three-year 
maturities in 51% of hedging quarters with an average hedging ratio of 25%, and programs with five-year maturities in 18% with an 
average hedging ratio of 28%. They also point out that near-term hedging ratios are more volatile than those with longer horizons. 
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) investigate the jet fuel hedging activities of U.S. airline firms during 1992-2003 and find that 
hedging maturities vary significantly between firms (e.g., from one year to six years ahead) and that hedging ratios of the next year’s 
fuel consumption are very disparate (e.g., from 1% to 43%).  
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the non-response bias associated with questionnaires and provide detailed information about real 
hedging activities. Finally, we study hedging activities of both commodities (oil and gas) separately, 
which gives deeper insight into oil and gas producers’ hedging dynamics.  
Consistent with our predictions, results of our base model (i.e., Dynamic System-GMM Panel 
Model) show that oil and gas producers, having substantial growth options, use hedging contracts with 
longer maturities to avoid shortfalls in their future cash flows. We also find that oil and gas producers 
with a higher positive correlation between their investment expenditures and internal cash flows tend 
to use short-term hedging contracts because they benefit from a natural hedge. In line with Fehle and 
Tsyplakov’s (2005) prediction, we give strong evidence of the non-monotonic (concave) relationship 
between measures of the likelihood of financial distress (i.e., leverage) and hedging maturity. This 
non-monotonic relationship means that hedging maturities increase and then decrease with the 
likelihood of financial distress.  
Results also indicate that distressed oil and gas producers (i.e., with insufficient liquidity) enter 
long-term put options as a risk-shifting (asset substitution) strategy. Costly put options with long 
maturities increase rather than eliminate the firm’s payoff volatility and decrease assets available for 
debtholders. Results further show that oil and gas producers with higher cash flow volatility, due to 
higher production uncertainty and/or higher price-quantity correlation, tend to use farther hedging 
positions to avoid shortfalls in their future revenues. We also observe strong evidence of the impact of 
market conditions on hedging maturity choice. Oil and gas price volatilities are significantly positively 
related to longer maturities hedging, as predicted by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). Accordingly, higher 
price volatility makes firms reluctant to incur costly early termination of their hedging contracts unless 
spot prices increase significantly. We further verify that when future prices are expected to be higher, 
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firms tend to use short-term hedging and we find empirical evidence of a non-monotonic (concave) 
relationship between oil and gas spot prices and hedging maturities.  
Results show that the hedging contract features (i.e., moneyness, strike price) have an evident 
impact on maturity choice. As predicted, oil and gas producers keep in-the-money hedging contracts 
until they mature and terminate out-of-the-money contracts early.  Results further imply that a hedging 
contract initiated at a sufficiently higher strike price is more likely to be kept for longer periods. 
Consistent with our prediction, tax function convexity motivates the use of long-term contracts and tax 
loss carry-forwards seem to be a disincentive to hedge longer exposures because they could be used as 
a caution to reduce firms’ future tax liabilities. With respect to asset-liability management, we find 
that oil and gas producers seek to match the maturities of their hedging and of their oil and gas 
developed reserves (i.e., assets) and debt.  
Results are largely robust to other data collection criteria. Specifically, we use maturity choice 
at inception of the hedging contracts and find results largely similar to those of our base specification 
(i.e., Dynamic System-GMM Panel Model). Our results are validated again when we study the 
determinants of the early termination of hedging contracts. Finally, we give novel evidence of the 
impact of hedging maturity on firm value and risk, and find that long-term hedging lowers the 
sensitivity of the stock return to changes in gas prices, in particular. However, we find no significant 
impact on sensitivity to oil and gas price volatility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state our hypotheses. In Section 
3, we describe our data, and dependent and independent variables. Section 4 presents the retained 
econometric methodology. Section 5 reports univariate results and Section 6 investigates the empirical 
evidence of the maturity structure of corporate risk management. In Section 7, we test the robustness 
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of our results by exploring the determinants of maturity choice at the inception of hedging contracts 
and the determinants of early termination of outstanding hedging contracts. We then investigate the 
real implications of hedging maturity choice empirically in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes the 
paper.  
2. Hypotheses 
The lack of testable theoretical predictions on hedging maturity structure was compensated by 
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). They present an infinite-horizon continuous time model of a firm that 
can adjust the hedge ratio and maturity of its hedging instruments dynamically in response to 
fluctuations in firm output price. Their model is calibrated to replicate empirical observations for a 
gold mining firm and produces a number of new theoretical predictions pertaining to the optimal 
timing, adjustment, and rollover of hedging contracts and their maturities, which we will describe in 
depth to develop our hypotheses in this section and test empirically after.   
2.1. Financial distress 
A large body of the empirical literature has analyzed the positive relationship between financial 
constraints and firms’ hedging activities (e.g., Nance et al (1993), Géczy et al (1997), Tufano (1996), 
Gay and Nam (1999), Adam (2002, 2009)). In line with this extant literature, Fehle and Tsyplakov 
(2005) analyzed the implications of financial distress on risk management adjustments. Based on 
simulations of output (gold) spot prices, they find a non-monotonic relationship between hedging 
maturity and measures of the probability of financial distress. This non-monotonicity means that 
hedging maturity first increases and then decreases with the probability of financial distress. To put it 
another way, firms near distress are often observed with short-run hedging contracts, and may 
terminate longer contracts at a high cost as a result of risk-shifting behavior. Firms far from distress 
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opt for short-term contracts because of the low marginal benefits of hedging for wealthy firms (e.g., 
Stulz (1996)).  
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) also find that financial distress costs are negatively related to 
hedging maturity. Their simulations show that firms with high distress costs tend to use shorter 
maturity hedging. Thus, distress costs increase when the firm’s cash inflows (i.e., its selling prices) are 
insufficient to cover production costs and debt payments. Hence we posit: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Hedging maturity is negatively related to (i) either high or low likelihood of 
financial distress, and (ii) higher distress costs. 
To verify the empirical relevance of this prediction we use the following two measures of the 
distress likelihood: (1) the leverage ratio as measured by the book value of long-term debt in current 
liabilities plus half of long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets as used by Moody’s-KMV, 
and (2) distance-to-default, which is the market-based measure originated from Merton’s (1974) 
approach. This measure gives the number of standard deviations that the firm is away from default 
(Crosbie and Bohn (2003)). We also use leverage squared and distance-to-default squared to capture 
non-linearity between financial soundness and hedging maturity. We predict a positive sign for the 
leverage ratio and distance-to-default and a negative sign for their squared values. 
Following Fehle and Tsyplakov’s (2005) methodology, we measure firm’s incurred distress 
costs by the following product ܫሾ	ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ െ ܯሿ	݉ܽݔሾ0,െ݌ ൅ ܿ ൅ ݀ሿ where ܫ is an indicator 
function and Liquidity is the quick ratio (i.e., cash and cash equivalents scaled by the book value of 
current liabilities). We use the quick ratio because a firm could use this liquidity as a caution to repay 
future debt requirements (see Dionne and Triki (2013)). M is the median quick ratio of the oil and gas 
industry. ܫሾܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ െ ܯሿ ൌ 1	݂݅	ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	 ൏ 	ܯ	and 0 otherwise. ݉ܽݔሾ0,െ݌ ൅ ܿ ൅ ݀ሿ means that 
a firm incurs distress costs that are proportional to the shortfall of its realized selling prices ݌ 
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compared with its production costs ܿ and debt payments	݀. These realized prices2 include the monetary 
effects of hedging activities, if any. The letter ܿ is for cash cost.3  Debt payments are measured by the 
quarterly interest expenses and the outstanding proportion of long-term debt to current liabilities at the 
end of the quarter, and are represented by ݀. The variables ݌, ܿ and ݀ are expressed per Barrel of Oil 
Equivalent (BOE). Therefore, a firm incurs distress costs when its liquidity is below the industry’s 
median and its actual cash inflows (i.e., realized selling prices net of production costs) are insufficient 
to meet debt requirements. These distress costs may entail higher future external financing costs. 
2.2. Market conditions 
The corporate hedging literature shows that market conditions, namely spot prices and their 
volatilities, play a crucial role in why firms hedge, how much they hedge, and how they hedge (see for 
instance Bodnar (1998); Stulz (1996); Brown and Toft (2002); Adam (2009)). Fehle and Tsyplakov 
(2005) investigate the evolution of risk management contracts and the spot price history by simulating 
the stochastic process of the gold spot price. Basically, they find strong evidence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between spot price and hedging contract maturity. This means that when spot prices are 
very high or low, firms choose short maturity hedging. As for Hypothesis 1, when spot prices are very 
high (low), the likelihood of distress is very low (high). For the range of spot prices between these two 
extremes, firms tend to adjust their risk management instruments more frequently and then tend to 
enter into newly initiated contracts with longer maturities. 
Moreover, Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) find that firms with higher price volatility tend to 
choose longer hedging contracts. In a higher price uncertainty environment, firms tend to refrain from 
costly early termination of their outstanding contracts unless spot prices increase significantly. These 
                                                            
2  Firms disclose their realized selling prices for oil and gas, respectively, on an annual basis. For each firm, we repeat the annual 
observation for each quarter of the same fiscal year. These realized prices include the monetary effects of the firm’s hedging activities if 
any. 
3 Cash costs are disclosed annually. For each firm, we repeat the same observation for each quarter of the same fiscal year. 
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firms often conclude long-run contracts. In addition, we expect that when future prices are anticipated 
to be higher, firms tend to terminate their outstanding contracts and initiate new risk management 
contracts with higher exercise prices. Moreover, the newly initiated contracts will be for short-term 
maturities to prevent them from being worthless in the future. We therefore propose: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Hedging maturity is negatively related to (i) either very high or very low spot 
prices, and (ii) higher anticipated prices. Conversely, firms prefer longer maturity contracts when 
price volatility is higher. 
We extract the oil and gas spot prices observed at the end of each quarter from the Bloomberg 
Financial Markets database.4 We calculate the volatility of oil and gas for each quarter as the standard 
deviation of daily spot prices within the quarter. As a proxy for the future tendency of oil and gas 
prices, we calculate an expected return by ܧሾܴ௧ሿ ൌ ݈݋݃ሾܨ௧/ܵ௧ሿ where ܨ௧ and ܵ௧ are respectively the 
prices of 12-month Futures5 contracts and the spot prices observed at the end of quarter t. We expect a 
positive sign for spot prices and volatilities, and a negative sign for spot prices squared and expected 
returns ܧሾܴ௧ሿ. 
2.3. Hedging contract features 
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) find that features of existing hedging contracts, namely 
moneyness, remaining maturity and strike price, play an important role in optimal rollover and 
adjustment decisions. Regarding these features, they derive the following prediction that we will 
investigate empirically.  
                                                            
4 We use the West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) index as proxy for the oil spot prices. For natural gas spot prices, we use an 
average index established by Bloomberg Financial Markets database from different location indices (Gulf Coast, Henry Hub, Rocky 
Mountains, etc.). 
5 For future oil and gas prices, we use (i) Bloomberg NYMEX Crude Oil 12-Month Strip futures price, and (ii) Bloomberg NYMEX 
Henry Hub Natural Gas 12-Month Strip futures price. These two indices are established by the Bloomberg Financial Markets database as 
the arithmetic averages of oil (gas) futures contract prices over the next 12 months. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Hedging contracts initiated at higher strike prices are more likely to be kept until 
maturity because they are more likely to be in the money for a longer period.   
As proxy for the strike price at initiation of the hedging contracts, we calculate the mean of the 
spot price during the quarter of the initiation. This proxy will give the information on the level of the 
strike price of the initiated contract. The moneyness is calculated by the strike price as previously 
mentioned minus the mean spot price in the current quarter. We predict a positive sign for both strike 
price and moneyness.  
2.4. Underinvestment costs  
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that firms with future investment expenditures and 
higher marginal costs of external financing should hedge to reduce the investment financing costs. 
Subsequent corporate risk management literature shows that hedging is more valuable for firms with 
substantial investment opportunities and costly external financing. The main argument is that hedging 
allows firms to reduce their cash flow volatility and hence avoid cutting planned profitable projects. In 
the same context, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) assert that a firm tends to hedge less the more 
closely correlated its internal cash flows are with its future investment opportunities. We thus explore 
the impact of the underinvestment argument on hedging contract maturity and we predict:  
HYPOTHESIS 4: Hedging maturity is positively related to firm’s growth options and negatively 
related to a positive correlation between internal cash flows and investment expenditures.  
Investment opportunities are measured by the ratio of the cost incurred over the net property, 
plant and equipment (net PP&E) at the beginning of the quarter.6 In the oil and gas industry, the cost 
incurred includes the total costs of oil and gas property acquisition, exploration and development. We 
                                                            
6 The cost incurred is given on an annual basis. We suppose that these costs are linearly dispersed over the year and divide the annual 
amount by four to get a quarterly cost incurred for the fiscal year. 
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also calculate the correlation coefficient between generated cash flows and costs incurred.7 It is worth 
noting that these calculated cash flows are not polluted or contaminated by the monetary effects of 
hedging because these effects are reported in comprehensive income as suggested by the new 
derivative accounting standard FASB 133, effective since 1998. The correlation coefficients are 
calculated, for each firm, in a rolling window by taking all the observations available until the current 
quarter. 
2.5. Production characteristics  
Several studies,8 mostly theoretical, have investigated the role of characteristics of production 
activity on firm’s hedging behavior. These studies demonstrate the importance of production 
uncertainty (i.e., quantity risk) and the correlation between produced quantities and spot prices on 
firm’s hedging programs (i.e., hedging extent and strategy choice). We explore the effects of these 
characteristics on hedging maturity choice. By deriving the optimal hedge analytically, Brown and 
Toft (2002) show that firms tend to hedge less for longer exposures because of the difficulty in 
forecasting their future produced quantities accurately.  
These theoretical models also highlight the important impact of the correlation between 
produced quantities and spot prices on hedging decisions. Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, Nam, and 
Turac (2002, 2003) find that firms with a negative price-quantity correlation benefit from a natural 
hedge with declining quantities and increasing prices, and vice versa. On the contrary, a positive price-
quantity correlation leads to higher variations in firm’s cash flows because both prices and quantities 
are moving in the same direction. Hence we propose: 
                                                            
7 Internally generated cash flows are measured by the Free Cash Flow before capital expenditures, as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989). They 
calculate Free Cash Flow before investment as operating income before depreciation less total income taxes plus changes in the deferred 
taxes from the previous quarter to the current quarter less gross interest expenses on short- and long-term debt less the total amount of 
preferred dividends less the total dollar amount of dividends declared on common stock. 
8 These studies include Moschini and Lapan (1995), Brown and Toft (2002), Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) and Adam (2009). 
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HYPOTHESIS 5: Hedging maturity is negatively related to production uncertainty and positively 
related to a positive price-quantity correlation.  
For each firm, we measure production uncertainty by the coefficient of variation of daily 
production9 for oil and gas respectively by taking all the observations available until the current 
quarter. We calculate the correlation coefficient between daily oil (gas) production and oil (gas) spot 
prices by taking all the firm’s observations available until the current quarter.  
2.6. Other control variables 
We include the following control variables largely retained in the corporate risk management 
literature.  
2.6.1. Managerial risk aversion 
As proxy for managerial risk aversion, we include the number of options and the market 
value10 of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO. According to Smith and Stulz (1985), managers should 
undertake hedging activities more actively if their utility is a concave function of firm value, and they 
should be reluctant to engage risk management activities if their utility is a convex function of the 
firm’s value. Therefore, we predict that a CEO owning a significant fraction of the firm’s common 
shares tends to use hedging contracts with longer maturities because he would like to insulate the firm 
value from the underlying risks. Conversely, we expect a CEO with significant option holdings to 
tolerate more volatility in firm value, and consequently prefer short-term hedging contracts.  
                                                            
9 Daily production for oil and gas, respectively, are disclosed by firms annually. We repeat the annual observation for each quarter of the 
same fiscal year. 
10 We use the number of options held by the firm’s CEO at the end of each quarter and we measure the CEO’s firm-specific wealth by 
the logarithm of one plus the market value of common shares held by the CEO at the end of each quarter. We use the logarithm 
specification of the market value of common shares held by CEOs to reflect the fact that the CEOs’ risk aversion should decrease as their 
firm-specific wealth increases (Tufano (1996)). 
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2.6.2. Tax incentives 
The tax argument for corporate hedging is accounted for using a simulation procedure 
proposed by Graham and Smith (1999) to estimate the expected percentage of tax savings arising from 
a 5% reduction in the volatility of pre-tax income. The tax argument means that hedging increases the 
firm’s after-tax value when its local tax function is convex. A firm will thus hedge more extensively 
when its taxable income is in the progressive region of the tax structure. We expect firms with higher 
tax function convexity to use hedging contracts with longer maturities that would increase the tax 
benefits of hedging. We also use the book value of tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of 
total assets. Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that tax loss carry-forwards are uncorrelated with tax 
function convexity, and that this variable might measure other corporate characteristics. Thus, we 
expect that it represents a disincentive to hedge because firms could use this tax shield to minimize 
their future tax liabilities. Therefore, we predict that firms with higher tax loss carry-forwards tend to 
use short-term hedging contracts. 
2.6.3. Asset-Liability Management 
Asset-Liability Management is also accounted for in our analysis. Maturity matching is a 
common best practice in corporate finance. We use the following two measures: (1) a weighted 
average maturity of debt. This average maturity is calculated as the book value-weighted average 
maturities of debt that mature within one, two, three, four and five years11; and (2) an expected life 
duration (in years) of developed reserves for oil and gas separately. This expected life duration is 
calculated by dividing the current quantity of oil (gas) developed reserves by the current annual oil 
(gas) production. These two variables allow us to capture any maturity matching between both the 
                                                            
11 These items are disclosed by COMPUSTAT on an annual basis. We repeat the annual observation for each quarter of the same fiscal 
year. 
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hedging strategy and the firm’s assets (proven reserves, which are the most important components of 
an oil and gas producer’s assets) and hedging strategy and the firm’s future debt commitments.  
3.  Sample construction and characteristics 
3.1. Sample construction 
This study is implemented on a sample of 150 US oil and gas producers over the period of 
1998 to 2010. The oil and gas industry is an excellent laboratory to test corporate risk management 
motivations and implications for several reasons. First, firms in this industry share homogenous risk 
exposures (i.e. fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas prices). Hence, diversity in hedging strategies 
implemented does not come from differences in risk exposure, but is more likely to result from 
differences in firm characteristics. Second, the existence of financial derivatives on crude oil and 
natural gas offer these firms several price hedging methods. Third, improvements in accounting 
disclosure related to oil and gas producing activities have made operational data available. These data 
pertain to exploration, production and reserve quantities, cash costs, etc. 
A preliminary list of 413 US oil and gas producers with the primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code 131112 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas) was extracted from Bloomberg. 
Only firms that met the following criteria were retained: have at least five years of historical data of 
oil and gas reserves during the period 1998-2010; the 10-K and 10-Q reports are available from the 
EDGAR website, and the firm is covered by COMPUSTAT. The filtering process produced a final 
sample of 150 firms with an unbalanced panel of 6,326 firm-quarter observations. To our knowledge, 
                                                            
12 SIC code 1311 ‘‘Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas,’’ which comprises companies primarily involved in the operation of properties for 
the recovery of hydrocarbon liquids and natural gas. 
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this sample is the most recent and the largest in the empirical literature on risk management in the oil 
and gas industry. 
Data on these firms’ financial and operational characteristics were gathered from several 
sources. Data regarding financial characteristics were taken from the COMPUSTAT quarterly dataset 
held by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Other items related to institutional and managerial 
share-holding and option-holding were taken from the Thomson Reuters dataset maintained by 
WRDS. Data related to oil and gas producers’ reserves, production quantities, cash costs, exploration, 
development and property acquisitions were taken from Bloomberg’s annual data set and verified and 
supplemented by hand-collecting data  directly from 10-K annual reports. Quarterly data about oil and 
gas producers’ hedging activities were hand-collected from 10-K and 10-Q reports.  
Table 1 summarizes the definitions, construction and data sources of the variables. 
[Table 1 here] 
3.2. Sample characteristics  
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics: Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is hedging maturity measured by the average remaining maturity 
weighted by the hedged notional quantity as follows: 
                                                              ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ∑ ே೅,ೕൈ்∑ ே೅,ೕೖశఱ೅సೖ
௞ାହ்ୀ௞  ,                                                         (1) 
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where ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ is the weighted-average remaining maturity for firm i at quarter t and hedging 
instrument  j. The hedging instrument could be swap contracts, put options, costless collars, forward 
or future contracts and 3-way collars. ்ܰ,௝ is the hedged notional quantity13 for instrument j and 
horizon T. T departs from the current fiscal year to five years ahead. We retain a maximum of five 
years because we rarely find firms with hedging positions exceeding this horizon. k takes the value of 
1 at the beginning of the current fiscal year or a fraction of the year otherwise (e.g., 0.75 for nine 
months). 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the weighted-average hedging maturity by hedging 
instruments for oil and gas hedgers separately. Overall, Table 2 shows that gas hedgers and oil hedgers 
adopt quite similar hedging horizons for each hedging instrument. For example, the average remaining 
maturity for swap contracts is 1.286 (1.227) years for gas (oil) hedgers. For put options, the remaining 
maturity is, on average, 1.023 (1.083) years for gas (oil) hedgers. Moreover, statistics show little 
variation of average remaining maturities across instruments. Swaps contracts and 3-way collars seem 
to have the longest average remaining maturity with respectively 1.286 and 1.187 years for gas 
hedgers, and 1.227 and 1.448 years for oil hedgers. Forward and future contracts appear to have the 
nearest average remaining maturities with 0.856 (0.818) years for gas (oil) hedgers. We also calculate 
the average remaining maturity for oil (gas) hedging portfolios that include two or more instruments 
simultaneously.  Hedging portfolios have an average remaining maturity of 1.222 (1.204) years for gas 
(oil) hedgers. Hedging horizons therefore seem to not differ significantly across oil and gas and across 
hedging instruments. Statistics related to hedging maturities reported in Table 2 are in line with 
previous empirical findings that firms tend to hedge near-term positions. 
                                                            
13 We follow Haushalter (2000) and use notional quantities for put options because we lack detailed information to calculate a delta-
percentage for these options. At least, we have three attributes of our sample that could mitigate this shortcoming in our study: (i) put 
options are used on average in 11% (12%) of firm-quarters with gas (oil) hedging, (ii) put options are used with either swap/or collars 
most, and (iii) the fraction of the quantity hedged by put options does not exceed 40% (50%) for gas (oil). 
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[Table 2 here] 
Table 2 also shows that gas hedging occurred in 3137 firm-quarters (49.58% of the firm-
quarters in the sample) and oil hedging occurred in 2607 firm-quarters (41.21% of the firm-quarters in 
the sample). Table 2 presents a breakdown of the frequency of use for each hedging instrument. The 
most common hedging vehicles used in the oil and gas industry are swap contracts, with 45.58% 
(45.25%) of use in gas (oil) hedging. The second most frequently used instrument is costless collars, 
with 37.19% (37.11%) for gas (oil) hedging. Next are Put options, with 10.55% for gas hedging and 
11.85% for oil hedging. The least used instruments are forward or Futures contracts, with only 3.25% 
(2.78%) for gas (oil) hedging and 3-way collars, with only 3.42% (3.02%) for gas (oil).  
3.2.2. Descriptive statistics: Independent variables 
Descriptive statistics are computed on the pooled dataset. Table 3 gives the mean, median, 1st 
quartile, 3rd quartile and standard deviation for the 150 U.S. oil and gas producers in the sample. 
Statistics show that oil and gas producers expend, on average, the equivalent of 22.37% of the book 
value of their net property, plant and equipment in exploration and reserve acquisition and 
development. The correlation between internal cash flows and investment expenditures has a mean 
(median) of 0.307 (0.373), with one fourth of the sample having a correlation less than -0.015 and 
another fourth a correlation greater than 0.70. These two specificities of the firm’s investment 
programs create opposite effects on the hedging needs of oil and gas producers because investment 
expenditures accentuate these needs and a higher positive correlation attenuates them. The two 
measures of financial constraints, namely distance-to-default and the leverage ratio, indicate that oil 
and gas producers have a relatively solid financial situation. Distance-to-default and leverage ratio 
have, respectively, a mean (median) of 2.234 (2.052) and 15.8% (14.2%), which reflects little variation 
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in the financial solvency of the sample firms.14 Surprisingly, statistics indicate that oil and gas 
producers in financial distress (i.e., with liquidity below the industry’s median, and realized selling 
prices insufficient to cover production costs and debt requirements) incurred on average distress costs 
of 2.3$/BOE. However, 75% of the sample does not incur any distress costs, and only a few producers 
have insufficient operating income to meet their debt commitments.  
[Table 3 here] 
Statistics further show higher production uncertainty, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation in daily production, with a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.31) for oil and 0.41 (0.30) for gas 
production respectively. Interestingly, the price-quantity correlation is relatively positive with a mean 
(median) of 0.23 (0.45) for oil and 0.15 (0.23) for gas. The higher level of production uncertainty and 
the positive price-quantity correlation create additional variability in generated cash flow, and 
consequently greater hedging needs for oil and gas producers. The tax preference item, measured by 
the ratio of the book value of tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets, has a 
mean (median) of 13.42% (0.00%). The expected tax saving benefits of hedging have a mean 
(median) of 5.24% (4.80%), which are quite similar to the findings of previous studies. The manager’s 
stock and option ownership varies considerably, with a mean (median) of 28.983 MM$ (1.125 MM$) 
for stockholding and 174,386 (0.000) for options. Debt maturity has a mean and median of 2 years. 
Oil and gas proven reserves have almost similar expected life durations, with a mean (median) of 9 (7) 
years. 
 
                                                            
14 Drucker and Puri (2009) examine the secondary market for loan sales in the USA over the 1999-2004 period. Using a sample of 7261 
loans, they find a mean (median) for Distance-to-Default of 2.304 (1.929). Campello et al (2011) study the implications of hedging for 
corporate financing and investment. Using a dataset of 1185 firms over the period 1996-2002, they find a mean (median) for the 
Distance-to-Default of 2.464 (1.861). 
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4. Econometric methodology 
The inspection of the time series characteristics of the remaining hedging maturity by 
instrument shows a high first-order serial correlation ranging from 0.8 to 0.9. This motivates the 
modeling of the hedging behavior within a dynamic rather than a static framework. The general model 
of the data-generating process is as follows: 
  ܪܯ௜,௧,௝ ൌ ߩ௝ܪܯ௜,௧ିଵ,௝ ൅	ߚ௝ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߮௝ ௝ܻ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,௝ ൅ ݑ௜,௝; 				 หߩ௝ห ൏ 1;	ሺ݅ ൌ 1,… , ܰ: ݐ ൌ 1,… , ௜ܶሻ,		     (2) 
where ܪܯ௜,௧,௝ is the remaining maturity for hedging instrument j used by firm i at time t. Hedging 
instrument j might be swaps contracts, put options, costless collars, forward and future contracts, or 3-
way collars. ܪܯ௜,௧ିଵ,௝	is the observation on the same series for the same firm in the previous period.    
௜ܺ,௧ is a set of observed exogenous variables related to investment programs, financial distress, taxes, 
managerial risk aversion, production function characteristics, oil and gas market conditions and asset-
liability management, which may be associated with hedging maturity choice for instrument j by firm i 
at time t.  ௜ܺ,௧ also includes the Inverse Mills Ratio coming from the first step of the Heckman 
regression with sample selection.	 ௝ܻ,௧ contains hedging contract j features at time t, namely,  
moneyness and strike price. ݑ௜,௝ is the unobserved firm-instrument specific effects and ߝ௜,௝,௧ is the 
disturbance term that is assumed to be independent across firms with Ε൫u୧,୨൯ ൌ Ε൫ε୧,୨,୲൯ ൌ
Ε൫u୧,୨	ε୧,୨,୲൯ ൌ 0. 
We follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in estimating the model 
in equation (2) by a Dynamic System-GMM Panel Model (SYS-GMM hereafter). We choose this 
special econometric specification because other econometric frameworks (e.g., OLS, 2SLS and Within 
Group estimates) lead to asymptotically inefficient estimates as mentioned by Bond (2002), especially 
for small time-series panel data. Moreover, we prefer a SYS-GMM specification over the Difference-
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GMM, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), because the latter model suffers from poor finite 
sample properties in terms of bias and precision, especially when the series are close to a random-
walk, as was subsequently well documented by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
A SYS-GMM15 estimate for dynamic panel data combines moment conditions for the model in 
first difference with moment conditions for the model in level which improves the estimates even 
when the series are very persistent. We use two-step estimation, which leads to standard errors that are 
theoretically robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals, 
but they are downward biased, as suggested by Roodman (2009a). To control for this bias, we 
implement the Windmeijer (2005) correction for the potential downward bias in the standard errors 
produced by two-step estimation. In addition, two-step estimation allows a robust Hansen J-test, which 
is not available in one-step estimation.  Following the good practice guideline suggested by Roodman 
(2009a, 2009b), we report statistics that allow us to test the validity of the econometric specification of 
the estimated SYS-GMM Model.  
To control for the possibility of sample selection bias, the estimation of all our models was 
derived in the context of the Two-Step Heckman Regression with Selection. This procedure captures 
the sequential decisions of oil and gas producers: a first decision to hedge or not and a second decision 
about the nature of the hedging strategy. In the first step, we follow the literature and model the 
existence of hedging activity as a function of variables that are conjectured to be determinants of the 
hedging decision: tax incentives, leverage ratio, liquidity, cash costs, convertible debt, firm market 
value, sales to capture the market risk exposure of firms, and oil and gas reserves quantities that 
should be qualified as hedging substitutes. Table A.I reports the estimation results of the first step. We 
observe that almost all variables are statistically significant and with appropriate signs, as already 
                                                            
15 We estimate the model in equation (2) with the user-written command xtabond2 in Stata Software developed by Roodman (2009b). 
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obtained in the previous literature on the decision to hedge (Tufano (1996); Graham and Rogers 
(2002); Campello et al (2011); Dionne and Triki (2013)). 
5. Univariate results 
Table 4 presents our univariate results, comparing oil and gas producers’ characteristics and 
market conditions, based on the remaining maturities of hedging portfolios (i.e., a simultaneous 
combination of hedging instruments). We then classify the remaining weighted-average maturities as 
(1) short-term maturities (i.e., below one year ahead), (2) medium-term maturities (i.e., between one 
and two years ahead), and (3) long-term maturities, exceeding two years ahead. Tests of differences 
between means and medians of relevant variables contrast short- and medium-terms to long-term 
maturities and are conducted for gas and oil hedgers separately. Comparison of means is constructed 
using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is constructed using a non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test and two-sided p-values are computed. 
[Table 4 here] 
The univariate tests show considerable differences between firm-quarters with long-term 
maturities and those with short- or medium-term maturities for oil hedgers and gas hedgers separately. 
Table 4 Panel A reports results pertaining to the subsample of gas hedgers and Panel B presents results 
for oil hedgers. Results show that oil and gas producers with higher distance-to-default tend to choose 
longer maturities.  Results related to the leverage ratio are mixed. Although the higher leverage ratio is 
related more to longer maturities for gas hedgers, it seems to be associated more with shorter 
maturities for oil hedgers. Counter to our predictions, higher distress costs are related more to long-run 
contracts for gas hedgers. Consistent with our predictions, results further show that oil and gas 
producers with higher growth opportunities prefer long-run hedging contracts, and that higher 
21 
 
correlation between free cash flows and investment expenditures motivates the use of short- and 
medium-term contracts.  
Univariate tests also show that oil and gas producers with higher production uncertainty tend to 
use long maturity contracts. This is inconsistent with the prediction that higher production uncertainty 
makes firms reluctant to make a large hedge for more distant exposures. We find that price-quantity 
correlation is more closely related to medium-term contracts for gas hedgers, and to long-term 
contracts for oil hedgers. In sum, these findings corroborate our prediction that firms with higher 
price-quantity correlation tend to use longer maturities because their cash flows are more volatile. 
Consistent with our prediction, the Wilcoxon test for difference in medians shows that higher CEO 
stake value in the firm is more related to long maturity contracts. In contrast, higher CEO option-
holdings are associated with long-term contracts, which contradicts the prediction that a manager with 
a convex utility in firm value has a disincentive to undertake corporate hedging. 
Univariate tests pertaining to tax incentives indicate that medium-term hedging is related to a 
higher percentage of tax savings for oil hedgers.  Consistent with our prediction, oil and gas producers 
with higher tax loss carry-forwards tend to use short maturity hedging. In addition, oil and gas 
producers with remaining longer maturities of debt and proven reserves tend to choose long-run 
contracts. This corroborates the asset-liability management argument. As predicted, results pertaining 
to market conditions suggest that higher spot prices and volatilities are associated more with medium-
term contracts for gas hedgers and longer contracts for oil hedgers. Conversely, when oil future prices 
are anticipated to be higher, oil hedgers tend to prefer long maturity contracts.   
Table 5 presents our results, comparing the moneyness and strike prices of hedging 
instruments based on their remaining maturities. Table 5 Panel A reports results pertaining to gas 
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hedgers and Panel B presents results for oil hedgers.  For conciseness, we concentrate our analysis on 
the three major hedging instruments used by oil and producers: swap contracts, put options and 
costless collars.16 For oil hedgers, we find that swap contracts with the longest maturities have the 
lowest moneyness as measured by the strike price minus the spot price. One explanation would be that 
firms are reluctant to exit out-of-the-money swaps prior to the agreed-upon termination date due to the 
termination costs. Consistent with our prediction, results also show that higher strike prices are related 
more to medium-term swaps for gas hedgers and to long-term swaps for oil hedgers. We further find 
that higher moneyness and strike prices are related more to medium-term put options in the case of gas 
hedging. As predicted, longer term put options are associated more with higher strike prices for oil 
hedgers. Consistent with predictions, longer term collars are related to higher moneyness and strike 
prices for both oil and gas hedgers.  
[Table 5 here] 
6. Maturity structure of corporate risk management 
To investigate the determinants of hedging maturity choice by oil and gas producers, we 
estimate the dynamic panel regression using a two-step SYS-GMM17 model as presented previously. 
In these regressions, the weighted-average remaining maturity is regressed on variables that measure 
underinvestment costs, financial distress costs, production function characteristics, managerial risk 
aversion, tax incentives, market conditions, asset-liability management and contract features. Many 
specifications of the SYS-GMM are estimated for the subset of oil hedgers and gas hedgers separately 
                                                            
16 We skip the observations related to forward/futures contracts because they contribute to only 3.25% of gas hedging activity and 2.78% 
of oil hedging activity. We also omit observations related to three-way collars because they are used in only 3.42% of cases for gas 
hedging activity and 3.02% of cases for oil hedging. 
17 Following the good practice guideline suggested by Roodman (2009a and 2009b), we use all available lags of the dependent variables 
as instruments to retain more information. We also apply a collapsing technique to avoid instrument proliferation that weakens the 
Hansen test instrument validity. We further report: (i) the number of instruments generated for the regression, (ii) the Hansen J-test 
statistics and p-value, and (iii) the Arellano-Bond test for a second-order serial correlation in residuals (e.g., AR (2) test). 
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and for the following major hedging instruments used: swap contracts, put options and costless collars. 
We based our analysis on remaining maturity by instrument rather than the whole hedging portfolio to 
get more insights into the hedging dynamics of oil and gas producers.   
[Table 6 and 7 here] 
The results in Tables 6 (gas hedgers) and 7 (oil hedgers) are generally consistent with 
hypotheses pertaining to underinvestment costs. In particular, oil and gas producers with higher future 
investment opportunities (INV_OPP) tend to use longer term swap contracts, put options and costless 
collars. Oil and gas producers with substantial growth opportunities employ hedging contracts with 
longer maturities to reduce any shortfall in their future cash flows and hence avoid both cutting 
planned investment programs and costly external financing. We also find a significant negative effect 
of a positive correlation between investment expenditures and internally generated cash flows 
(COR_CI_CF) and hedging contract horizon because firms benefit from a natural hedge. We find that 
the remaining maturities of put options and swap contracts decline with this positive correlation for gas 
hedgers and oil hedgers respectively. The impacts on costless collars’ maturities are mixed and 
insignificant. Interestingly, results reveal opposite effects of firm’s investment specificities on hedging 
maturity structure: growth options accentuate future funding needs and a positive correlation dampens 
this need. These opposite effects are essentially driven by the simultaneous positive impacts of current 
oil and gas prices on future investment opportunities and present cash inflows. 
The results pertaining to financial distress give strong evidence of the non-monotonic 
relationship between hedging horizons and the likelihood of financial distress. In line with Fehle and 
Tsyplakov’s (2005) prediction, we find that the leverage ratio (LEV) and the leverage squared 
(LEV_SQUARE) have highly significant positive and negative coefficients respectively for both 
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subsets of gas hedgers and oil hedgers, for the three hedging instruments.18 These non-monotonic 
(concave) relationships mean that hedging maturities should first increase and then decrease with the 
likelihood of financial distress. To further investigate this non-monotonic relationship empirically, we 
use an alternative robust measure of the likelihood of financial distress, namely, distance-to-default. 
Interestingly, results show that remaining maturity should increase and decrease with the distance to 
default. Generally, we find that Distance-to-Default (DTD) and its squared value (DTD_SQUARE) are 
respectively significantly positively and negatively related to hedging instrument maturity. The non-
monotonic relationship between hedging maturity and leverage ratio is shown, for each hedging 
instrument, in Figure 1 for gas hedgers and in Figure 2 for oil hedgers. These figures suggest show that 
this non-monotonic relationship is more pronounced for put options for gas hedgers and for costless 
collars for oil hedgers. 
[Figure 1 and 2 here] 
In contrast with our hypotheses, we find that distressed oil and gas producers incurring a higher 
dollar loss per Barrel of Oil Equivalent (DIS_COSTS) tend to use put options with longer maturities. 
This empirical finding contradicts the simulation results of Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), who find that 
firms incurring higher distress costs tend to use short-term hedging contracts. A possible explanation 
comes from Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) risk shifting (or asset substitution) approach. By entering 
costly long-term put options, distressed oil and gas producers increase rather than eliminate the firm’s 
payoff volatility, decrease assets available for debtholders and preserve any upside potential for 
shareholders.  
                                                            
18 As robustness checks, we measure the leverage ratio by: (i) long-term debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt scaled by total 
assets, (ii) long-term debt scaled by total assets. Results are the same.  
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Results further indicate that oil and gas producers with higher production uncertainty 
(PROD_CV_OIL and PROD_CV_GAS) tend to use long-term swap contracts and costless collars. The 
impact on put options’ maturities is also positive but not significant. This finding contradicts Brown 
and Toft (2002), who assert that higher production uncertainty makes firms reluctant to hedge farther 
exposures. As predicted, we find that higher price-quantity correlations (COR_PQ_OIL and 
COR_PQ_GAS) motivate oil and gas hedgers to use more distant costless collar positions. A higher 
price-quantity correlation induces higher firm cash flow volatility because both prices and quantities 
are moving in the same direction. Altogether, we find that oil and gas producers with higher cash flow 
volatility, due to higher production uncertainty and/or higher price-quantity correlation, tend to use 
longer hedging positions to avoid shortfalls in their future revenues.  
The results for the variables pertaining to market conditions are highly consistent with our 
predictions.  We find that oil and gas price volatilities (OIL_VOL and GAS_VOL) are significantly 
positively related to longer maturities for the three hedging instruments. This corroborates the 
simulation results of Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), namely that in a higher price fluctuation 
environment, firms tend to refrain from costly early termination of their outstanding contracts unless 
spot prices increase significantly. We further find that when future gas prices are expected to be 
higher, as measured by GAS_RET, gas hedgers tend to use short-term hedging. This is consistent with 
the prediction that when future prices are expected to be higher, firms tend to terminate their 
outstanding contracts and initiate new hedging contracts with higher exercise prices. In addition, these 
newly initiated contracts have short maturities to prevent them from being worthless in the future. 
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Surprisingly, expected tendency in future oil prices, as measured by OIL_RET, has the predicted 
negative sign but no significant impact.19 
Our results also provide strong evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between spot prices 
and hedging maturities, as conjectured by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). We find that oil and gas spot 
prices (OIL_SPOT and GAS_SPOT) and the spot prices squared (OIL_SPOT_SQUARE and 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE) have highly significant positive and negative coefficients respectively, yielding 
a non-monotonic relationship. Accordingly, when spot prices are either very high or very low, firms 
are more likely to choose short-term hedging contracts. This corroborates the non-monotonic 
relationship between financial distress likelihood measures (i.e., leverage ratio and distance-to-default) 
and hedging maturity. When spot prices are very high or low, firms are more likely to be far from or 
deep in financial distress respectively. Figures 3 and 4 show the non-monotonic relationship between 
hedging maturity and spot prices for gas hedgers and oil hedgers separately. The non-monotonic 
relationship is more evident for swap contracts for oil hedgers.   
[Figure 3 and 4 here] 
Hedging contract features appear to have an evident impact on hedging maturity choice. 
Results show that swap contracts and costless collars with higher MONEYNESS (e.g., strike prices 
higher than current spot prices) tend to have longer maturities. For put options, moneyness has the 
predicted sign but no significant impact. As predicted, oil and gas producers keep in-the-money 
hedging contracts until they mature and early terminate out-of-the-money contracts. Results also 
indicate that when hedging contracts are initiated at sufficiently higher prices (STRIKE) they are more 
likely to be kept for longer periods.  
                                                            
19 We further investigate the effects of anticipated oil and gas prices, as observed in the future contracts market, on hedging maturity 
choice by using the following Futures terms: three, six, fifteen, eighteen and twenty four months ahead. Our results are unchanged with 
12-month future contracts.  
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Consistent with our expectations, we find that oil and gas producers with higher tax loss carry-
forwards (TLCF) choose short-term hedging maturities. Tax loss carry-forwards thus seem to be a 
disincentive to hedge longer exposures because they reduce firms’ future tax liabilities. This 
corroborates the argument of Graham and Rogers (2002) that tax loss carry-forwards are uncorrelated 
with tax function convexity. As predicted, results further show a significant positive association 
between tax function convexity (TAX_SAVE) and put option and costless collar maturities for gas 
hedgers, in particular. For oil hedgers, the tax function convexity measure has the predicted sign but 
no significant impact.  
Results for variables pertaining to asset-liability management are as predicted. We find that oil 
and gas producers with longer average debt maturity (DEBT_MAT) tend to use more distant swap and 
collar positions.20 Average debt maturity appears to have no significant impact on put option maturity. 
We document strong evidence of a positive impact of the expected life duration of proven oil and gas 
reserves (RES_MAT_OIL and RES_MAT_GAS) on maturities of the three hedging instruments. These 
results suggest that oil and gas producers seek to match the maturities of their hedging and the 
maturities of their assets and debt. The CEO’s stake value in the firm (CEO_CS) seems to have no 
impact on hedging maturity choice. CEO option-holding has a mixed impact. Although CEO option-
holding (CEO_OPT) is negatively related to collar maturities for gas hedgers, it is positively related to 
swap maturities for oil hedgers.   
                                                            
20  We use an alternative measure of average debt maturity as described by Eisdorfer (2008). The firm’s average debt maturity is 
estimated by:  ෠ܶ ൌ ଵ்஽	ሺ0.5	ܵܶܦ ൅ 5	ܮܶܦሻ where TD, STD, and LTD are the book values of total, short-term, and long-term debt. Our 
results are the same. 
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7. Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the empirical relevance of our predictions and our previous 
findings by: (i) studying maturity choice at hedging contract inception, (ii) and investigating the 
determinants of the early termination of outstanding hedging contracts. 
7.1. Maturity choice at the inception of the hedging contract 
We skim the time series of the weighted-average maturity by hedging instrument and detect 
initiation dates by choosing observations where the observed maturity at time T is superior to the one 
at time T-1. We run a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression of the weighted-average maturities 
at the inception dates on firm’s fundamentals, production function characteristics and oil and gas 
market conditions. Table 8 and 9 report the regression results for gas hedgers and oil hedgers 
separately. 
[Table 8 and 9 here] 
In line with the baseline model (i.e., SYS-GMM), results illustrate the opposite effects of 
investment program specificities and the non-monotonic relationship between new contracts’ 
maturities and measures of likelihood of financial distress (LEV and DTD). Distress costs and 
production uncertainty have the same positive impact on hedging maturities of newly initiated 
contracts. Results also indicate that the maturities of newly initiated hedging contracts are increasing 
with strike prices and reserves’ expected life duration, and decreasing with tax loss carry-forwards. 
The coordination between debt maturity and newly initiated collars is again confirmed but it 
disappears for initiated swaps. Results further show, for gas hedgers, that managers with a higher stake 
value in the firm prefer long-term collars, as predicted. 
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However, impacts of leverage ratio and gas price-quantity correlation on maturities of newly 
initiated swaps contradict our previous findings. Surprisingly, oil and gas market conditions largely 
lose their effect on hedging contract maturity at initiation. The non-monotonic relationship with spot 
prices appears to exist only for newly initiated swaps’ maturities for oil hedgers. Dissimilar to baseline 
model results, oil hedgers tend to initiate longer maturity swaps and collars when anticipated oil prices 
are increasing. One possible explanation for this finding could be that, when oil prices are anticipated 
to be high in the near term (e.g., we use 12-month future contracts), firms believe that they are more 
likely to decline in the long run (i.e., mean reversion); hence they tend to initiate long-term hedging 
contracts to lock-in higher strike prices.21 Managerial option-holding appears to have no significant 
impact on maturity choice at the inception of hedging contracts.  
7.2.Determinants of the early termination decision of hedging contracts 
Termination of a hedging contract is considered as an early termination when the outstanding 
hedging contract has a remaining weighted-average maturity equal to or above six months. For each 
instrument, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one when we pick up observations of 
no-hedging preceded by an outstanding hedging with remaining maturity equal to or above six months 
and zero otherwise. We run pooled cross-sectional time-series probit regressions of these dummy 
variables on firm fundamentals, production characteristics and oil and gas market conditions. Tables 
10 and 11 report the regression results for gas hedgers and oil hedgers separately. 
[Tables 10 and 11 here] 
                                                            
21 We use the following Futures’ terms for anticipated oil and gas prices, as observed in the future contracts market: three, six, fifteen, 
eighteen and twenty-four months ahead. We observe changes only for put option maturities, which become significantly negatively 
affected by three- and six-month gas future prices, as predicted.  
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We find strong evidence of a non-monotonic (convex) relationship between early termination 
of swap contracts and leverage ratio, in particular.22 This finding means that early termination of swap 
contracts decreases then increases with the probability of financial distress. Put options and costless 
collars also exhibit a non-monotonic (convex) relationship with financial leverage but with lower 
statistical significance. This empirical evidence corroborates our previous findings. Price-quantity 
correlations are negatively related to early termination. This is in line with predictions and previous 
findings that firms with positive price-quantity correlation tend to use longer hedging positions 
because their generated cash flows are more volatile. 
Consistent with our previous findings, higher oil and gas price volatilities prevent the early 
termination of hedging positions.  Results further indicate that when future oil prices are anticipated to 
be higher, firms tend to early terminate their outstanding swap contracts to profit from the rising prices 
or to lock in higher strike prices for new contracts. Results again show an evident non-monotonic 
(convex) relationship between early termination and oil and gas spot prices. When oil and gas prices 
attain higher levels, outstanding hedging contracts are actively terminated and might be replaced by 
new contracts with higher strike prices.   
Results also show that in-the-money swap contracts are less likely to be prematurely 
terminated by oil hedgers. The remaining maturity of hedging contracts is statistically negatively 
related to early termination, namely contracts with longer remaining maturity are less likely to be 
prematurely terminated. Possible explanations could be that the early termination of longer contracts 
generates higher termination costs, and/or for longer maturities market conditions could improve over 
the remaining life of the contract, which becomes more beneficial for hedgers. The impact of debt 
maturity on early termination is negative as predicted but significant only in cases of swap contracts 
                                                            
22 We also use distance-to-default and find similar results. 
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for gas hedgers and put options for oil hedgers. Unexpectedly, higher percentages of tax save 
motivates the early termination of put options by oil hedgers, and longer gas reserves duration 
motivates the early termination of collar positions. As predicted, managers with higher stockholding 
tend to maintain their outstanding hedging contracts, in particular put options and collars. 
8. Real implications of hedging maturity choice 
In this section, we extend the controversial existing literature that focuses on the relationship 
between corporate hedging and firm risk and value. One strand of this empirical literature finds no 
support for the risk reduction argument and firm value maximization theory (see for instance 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001); Guay and Kothari (2003); Jin and Jorion (2006); Fauver and Naranjo 
(2010)). In contrast, another strand of the literature shows that firm’s derivative transactions translate 
into increases in shareholder value (Allayannis and Weston (2001); Graham and Rogers (2002); 
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006); Adam and Fernando (2006); Bartram, Brown, and Conrad 
(2011)). Other studies give empirical evidence of risk reduction associated with derivative usage (e.g., 
Guay (1999); Allayannis and Ofek (2001); Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011)). Aretz and Bartram 
(2010) review the existing empirical literature on corporate hedging and firm value and risk. 
We complement the empirical literature by going into further detail and investigating the real 
implications of the maturity structure of corporate risk management on: (1) firms’ stock return 
sensitivity to changes in oil and gas prices; (2) firms’ stock volatility sensitivity to oil and gas price 
volatilities. In addition, our study does not suffer from the endogeneity concern related to derivatives 
use as advanced by Jin and Jorion (2006) to explain the controversial results in the literature. This is 
because we select firms within the same industry; they have the same exposure to commodity risks 
and they differ vastly in terms of their hedging behaviors. To our knowledge, no empirical study to 
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date gives direct evidence of the effects of maturity structure of corporate hedging on firm value and 
risk. 
8.1. Effects of hedging maturity on stock return sensitivity 
Our tests expand on that of Jorion and Jin (2006), who run pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regressions of firms’ stock returns on the market and oil and gas price changes, and control for 
commodity risk hedging and proven oil and gas reserves. We estimate the following models with 
interaction variables reflecting the impact of hedging maturity in oil beta: 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚ௠ ൈ ܴ௠,௧ ൅ ൬ߛ௢௜௟ ൅ ∑ ߛ௝ ൈ ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛସଷ௝ୀଵ ൈ ௢௜௟	௥௘௦௘௥௩௘೔,೟షభெ௏ா೔,೟షభ ൰ ൈ ܴ௢௜௟,௧ ൅ ߚ௚௔௦ ൈ ܴ௚௔௦,௧ ൅
ߝ௜,௧                                                                                                                                                           (3) 
and a symmetric equation for gas beta. ,i tR  is the total stock rate of return for firm i in month t, ,m tR  is 
the monthly return of the S&P 500 index, ,oil tR  is the monthly rate of change in the price of the 
NYMEX WTI crude oil near-month futures contract, , gas tR  is the monthly rate of change in the price 
of the NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas near-month futures contract. ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵ are three variables 
reflecting outstanding maturities for swap contracts, put options and costless collars at the end of the 
previous month for oil (gas) hedgers.23 Oil reserve/MVE (gas reserve/MVE) are the discounted dollar 
values of oil (gas) developed reserves divided by the market value of equity.24 The model in (3) allows 
us to detect the impact of the maturity structure on the sensitivity of firm’s stock return to changes in 
oil and gas prices. We then predict negative signs on the maturities of the three hedging strategies (i.e., 
                                                            
23 We collect hedging strategy observations on a quarterly basis.  For the first two months of each fiscal quarter, we repeat the 
observations at the end of the previous fiscal quarter.  We then suppose that hedging strategies outstanding at the end of the previous 
fiscal quarter are effective until the end of the current fiscal quarter when we update the observations with the new information reported 
by firms. 
24 We calculate developed oil and gas reserve quantities on a quarterly basis by considering production, development, and acquisition and 
exploration activities.  For the first two months of each fiscal quarter, we repeat the observations at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. 
Following SFAS No. 69 and SEC regulations, we calculate a standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows from developed 
reserves by considering current oil and gas prices, current production quantities and costs, and a discounting rate of 10%.  The ratio of 
reserve/MVE is updated monthly by considering the firm’s new stock, oil and gas prices. 
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swaps, put, and collars). Oil and gas reserves should have positive signs because a greater ratio of 
reserve/MVE induces greater exposure to oil and gas price fluctuations. We include firm fixed effects 
and correct standard errors for within-firm correlation (clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the 
Huber-White-Sandwich estimator. We further include the inverse Mills ratios coming from the 
Heckman first-step for both subsets of oil hedgers and gas hedgers. 
Panel A of Table 12 reports the estimations of the model in (3).  Columns (1) and (2) of Panel 
A display the estimation of models with interaction variables between the remaining maturity of the 
hedging portfolio (i.e., weighted-average maturity of all outstanding hedging instruments) at the end 
of the previous month and the monthly rate of change in the prices of the NYMEX oil and gas futures 
contracts for subsets of gas hedging and oil hedging separately. Results show that these interaction 
variables have the predicted negative sign. However, this negative relationship is statistically 
significant only for gas hedgers. Longer hedging maturities could lower the sensitivity of stock return 
to changes in gas prices. Going further in detail, Column (3) of Panel A indicates that swap contracts 
and costless collars positions with the longest maturities could achieve the lowest sensitivity of stock 
return to changes in gas prices. Put options have the predicted negative sign but no significant impact. 
For oil hedgers, the three hedging instruments have no significant impact on the sensitivity of stock 
return to changes in oil prices as observed for the oil hedging portfolio (Column 4).  
Consistent with Rajgopal (1999), and Jin and Jorion (2006), results show that greater oil and 
gas reserves accentuate a stock’s exposure to oil and gas price fluctuations. We repeat our regressions 
and replace the ratio of reserve/MVE by the production mix, namely the ratio of the daily gas or oil 
production quantity divided by the total daily oil and gas production, and find similar results. The 
coefficients of the production mix ratios are positive, as predicted, and have higher economic 
significance.  
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[Table 12 here] 
8.2. Effects of hedging maturity on stock volatility sensitivity 
This sub-section provides detailed evidence of the relation of firms’ total risk measured by the 
annualized stock return volatility, and firms’ hedging strategies. Our aim is to examine which hedging 
maturity better mitigates the effects of the exposure to oil (gas) price volatilities on firms’ total risk. 
Following Guay (1999), we partition the total stock return volatility into market risk, oil and gas risks 
and firm-specific risk. We then estimate the following model with interaction variables for oil 
hedgers: 
ߪ௜,௧ ൌ ߱଴ ൅ ߱௠ ൈ ߪ௠,௧ ൅ ൫߱௢௜௟ ൅ ∑ ௝߱ ൈ ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵଷ௝ୀଵ ൯ ൈ ߪ௢௜௟,௧ ൅ ௚߱௔௦ ൈ ߪ௚௔௦,௧ ൅ ∑ ௝߱ ൈ௝଼ୀସ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ ߜ௜,௧                                                                                                                                     (4) 
and a symmetric equation for gas hedgers where , i t  is the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns for firm i during month t to capture the aggregate firm risk, , m t  is the annualized 
standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index returns during month t, , oil t  are , gas t  are the annualized 
standard deviations of daily returns of the NYMEX WTI crude oil and Henry Hub natural gas near-
month futures contracts during month t. ܪܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵ		are outstanding remaining maturities as previously 
defined. ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ are a set of exogenous variables related to firms’ characteristics. We retain firm 
size, leverage and liquidity, which Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012) find to be important determinants 
of both firm total risk and systematic risk. We also use Distance-to-Default, defined above, and the 
inverse Mills ratios coming from the Heckman first-step for both subsets of oil hedgers and gas 
hedgers respectively. This specification partitions total stock return volatility into firm-specific 
exposures to oil and gas volatilities, global market index risk and firm-specific characteristics. We 
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include firm fixed effects and correct standard errors for within-firm correlation (clustering) and 
heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator.  
Panel B of Table 12 reports the estimations of the model in (4). Panel B also shows the 
estimation of models with interaction variables between the remaining maturity of the hedging 
portfolio at the end of the previous month and annualized standard deviations for oil and gas NYMEX 
contracts respectively (Column 5 and 6). Overall, results show that these interaction variables, in all 
the specifications, have no statistically significant effects on the sensitivity of stock volatility to 
commodity price risk. Results also suggest that larger firms with higher financial leverage have higher 
return volatility, and firms with higher Distance-to-Default and carrying higher cash balances have 
lower stock return volatility. 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
A substantial body of the corporate risk management literature has increased our understanding of 
the motivations, virtues and value implications of hedging. This literature derives its theoretical or 
empirical predictions based on hedging extent or hedging activity participation. Due to the lack of 
data, the empirical maturity structure of corporate risk management is discussed in a largely 
descriptive manner. In this study, we go beyond the classical questions in the corporate hedging 
literature and investigate the following empirical questions: How far ahead do firms hedge? What are 
the determinants of the maturity structure of firms’ hedging programs? and What are the economic 
effects of hedging maturities on firm value and risk?  
Using an extensive and new hand-collected dataset on the risk management activities of 150 
U.S. oil and gas producers and the empirical predictions of Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), we find that 
the maturity structure of corporate hedging is positively influenced by firms’ investment opportunities. 
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Results also show that a positive correlation between investment expenditure and generated cash flows 
gives firms a natural hedge and motivates the use of short-term contracts. We provide strong evidence 
that hedging maturities should increase and then decrease with the likelihood of financial distress, as 
conjectured by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). Highly distressed oil and gas producers should enter long-
term put options as a risk-shifting strategy. Results indicate that oil and gas producers with higher cash 
flow volatility tend to use longer maturity hedging to avoid shortfalls in their future cash flows.  
Interestingly, we observe strong evidence of the impact of market conditions on hedging 
maturity choice. We give empirical evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between oil and gas spot 
prices and hedging maturities, as suggested by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). In addition, hedging 
contract features (i.e., moneyness, strike price) have an evident impact on maturity choice. Regarding 
asset-liability management, oil and gas producers appear to match the maturities of their hedging 
positions and the maturities of their assets and debt. Tax function convexity seems to influence the 
maturity structure of firm’s hedging. We also give the first direct evidence of the motivations for early 
termination of hedging contracts, which appears to be strongly influenced by the likelihood of 
financial distress, spot prices and their volatilities, price-quantity correlation, and the remaining 
maturities of contracts. We also find evidence of a non-monotonic (convex) relationship between early 
termination and financial leverage and spot prices. Table 13 summarizes our predictions and findings 
arising from the baseline model (i.e., SYS-GMM), maturity choice at inception of the hedging 
contract, and early termination of contracts. Overall, this table shows that our findings are stable and 
consistent across these tests. Finally, we explore the real effects of hedging maturity on firm value and 
risk, and provide empirical evidence that long-term hedging lowers the sensitivity of the stock return 
to changes in gas prices in particular. 
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Table 13: Summary of our predictions and findings 
This table presents a summary of our predictions and findings pertaining to the hypotheses tested. The superscripts ***, **, and * mean that the sign is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively; -/+ means that the given variable takes the minus sign in some specifications and the plus sign in others, but with no significant effects; n/a stands for non-
available and means that the given variable is not included in the regression. 
 
 Hedging maturity structure 
Baseline model: SYS-GMM 
Maturity choice at the inception of the contract Early termination of the contract 
 
Hedging strategies 
Swap 
contracts 
Put  
options 
 
Costless 
Collars 
Swap 
contracts 
Put  
options 
Costless 
collars 
Swaps 
contracts 
Put 
options 
Costless 
collars 
Investment programs and real options 
Investment opportunities Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
Gas Hedgers +*** +*** + + - +** + - + 
Oil Hedgers +** +** +* + +*** +*** - + + 
Correlation between 
internal funds and 
Investment programs 
Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
Gas Hedgers - -** -/+ -*** -*** - - + - 
Oil Hedgers -*** + + -*** - - - + + 
Oil and gas market conditions 
Spot price Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
Gas Hedgers +*** +*** +**** - + +** -*** -*** -*** 
Oil Hedgers +*** + +*** +*** + +** -*** -*** -*** 
Spot price squared Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** -*** -*** + - - + +*** +*** 
Oil Hedgers -*** - -** -*** - - +*** +** +*** 
Return Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
Gas Hedgers -** -*** -*** -/+ - - + - + 
Oil Hedgers -/+ - - +*** -/+ +*** +*** + + 
Price volatility Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
Gas Hedgers +*** +*** +** - -/+ + -*** - -** 
Oil Hedgers +*** +** +*** +** +** + -** - -** 
Oil and gas production function characteristics 
Production uncertainty Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
Gas Hedgers +** + +*** + +** +*** + - - 
Oil Hedgers +* + - +*** - -* + - - 
Price–quantity Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
correlation Gas Hedgers + -/+ +** -** -* + - - -* 
Oil Hedgers + -/+ +** -/+ - +*** -** -* -*** 
Financial distress 
Leverage Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** +*** +*** -** +** +** -*** -* - 
 Oil Hedgers +*** +** +*** -*** - - -*** - -** 
Leverage squared Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
 Gas Hedgers -*** -*** -*** +*** -** -* +*** + + 
 Oil Hedgers -** - -*** +*** + + +*** + + 
Distance to default Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** + +*** - - + n/a n/a n/a 
 Oil Hedgers +** +*** +*** +*** +*** +** n/a n/a n/a 
Continued 
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Table 13-Contunied 
           
 
 
Baseline model: SYS-GMM 
Maturity choice 
Maturity choice at the inception of the contract Early termination of the contract 
 
Hedging strategies 
Swap 
contracts 
Put  
options 
 
Costless 
Collars 
Swap 
contracts 
Put  
options 
Costless 
collars 
Swaps 
contracts 
Put 
options 
Costless 
collars 
Distance to default Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
squared Gas Hedgers -* + -*** + + - n/a n/a n/a 
 Oil Hedgers - -*** -** -*** -*** -* n/a n/a n/a 
Distress costs Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
 Gas Hedgers + +* + +** +** + - - + 
 Oil Hedgers -/+ +*** + +* +*** -/+ - - + 
Contract features 
Moneyness Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** + +* n/a n/a n/a - - + 
 Oil Hedgers +*** + +*** n/a n/a n/a -*** - - 
Strike price Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** +*** +*** - +** +*** n/a n/a n/a 
 Oil Hedgers +*** +*** +*** +*** +** +*** n/a n/a n/a 
Remaining maturity Predicted       - - - 
 Gas Hedgers       -* -*** -*** 
 Oil Hedgers       -*** -** -*** 
Tax incentives 
Tax loss carry-forwards Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
 Gas Hedgers -*** -*** -** -*** -*** - n/a n/a n/a 
 Oil Hedgers -*** -*** - -*** -*** -*** n/a n/a n/a 
Tax save Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers -/+ +** +** -* - + - - - 
 Oil Hedgers + + + -/+ + - + +* + 
Asset-liability management 
Debt maturity Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** -/+ +*** + -/+ +** -* - - 
 Oil Hedgers +*** -/+ +*** + + +** - -*** - 
Reserve expected life Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +** + - +* 
 Oil Hedgers +*** +** +*** +*** +** + + - - 
Managerial compensation policy 
Managerial shareholding Predicted + + + + + + - - - 
 Gas Hedgers + -/+ + + -/+ +** - -* -* 
 Oil Hedgers - - - - -/+ + - - - 
Managerial option holding Predicted - - - - - - + + + 
 Gas Hedgers + -/+ -*** + -/+ + - + -* 
 Oil Hedgers +* -/+ - + + + - + - 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and construction, and data sources 
Variable definition Variable name Construction Data source 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage of hedging 
Tax loss carry-forwards TLCF Book value of the TLCF scaled by the book value of total assets Compustat 
Tax save                                    TAX_SAVE Tax liability saving arising from a 5% reduction in taxable 
income (Graham and Smith (1999)). 
Compustat 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
Leverage LEV Book value of long-term debt in current liabilities + one-half of 
long-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets. 
Compustat 
Distance-to-default DTD Market-based measure of default risk based on Merton’s (1974) 
approach and used by Moody’s KMV. The DTD is equal to 


a
a a
V D
V
, where D is defined as long-term debt in current 
liabilities plus one-half of long-term debt, aV  is the market value 
of assets, and 	ߪܽ is one-year asset volatility. The quantities aV
and  	ߪܽ  are unobservable and are approximated from Merton’s 
(1974) model by using the market value and volatility of equity, 
the three-month Treasury bill rate, and debt (D). See Crosbie and 
Bohn (2003) for more details on the construction of the DTD. 
Manually constructed 
Financial distress costs DIST_COSTS Measured by ܫሾ ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ െ ܯሿ ݉ܽݔሾ0,െ݌ ൅ ܿ ൅ ݀ሿ where 
Liquidity is the quick ratio, M is the median quick ratio of the oil 
and gas industry,  ݌ are the realized selling prices, 	ܿ are 
production costs, and ݀ debt payments. ݌, ܿ and ݀ are expressed	
per	Barrel	of	Oil	Equivalent.	 ܫሾܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ െ ܯሿ ൌ
1 ݂݅ ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ ൏ ܯ and 0 otherwise. 
Manually constructed 
Cash cost CASH_COST Production cost of a BOE Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
Investment opportunities 
(IOs) 
INV_OPP Total costs incurred in oil and gas property acquisition, 
exploration, and development, scaled by net property, plant, and 
equipment at the beginning of the quarter. 
Manually constructed 
Correlation between 
investment expenditures and 
free cash flows. 
COR_CI_CF Correlation coefficient between free cash flow and costs incurred. 
This coefficient is calculated for each firm by using all the 
observations until the current quarter. 
Manually constructed 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
Oil production 
uncertainty 
PROD_CV_OIL Coefficient of variation of daily oil production. This coefficient 
is calculated for each firm by using all the observations of daily 
oil production until the current quarter.  
Manually constructed 
Gas production uncertainty PROD_CV_GAS Coefficient of variation of daily gas production. This coefficient 
is calculated for each firm by using all the observations of daily 
gas production until the current quarter. 
Manually constructed 
Price–quantity correlation 
(oil) 
COR_PQ_OIL Correlation coefficient between daily oil production and oil spot 
prices. 
Manually constructed 
Price–quantity correlation 
(gas) 
COR_PQ_GAS Correlation coefficient between daily gas production and gas 
spot prices. 
Manually constructed 
Variables that proxy for firm size 
Sales  SALES Total revenues from oil and gas sales (in millions of dollars) Compustat 
Market value MKT_VALUE Number of common shares outstanding * end-of-quarter per 
share price (in millions of dollars). 
Compustat 
Oil reserves RES_OIL Quantity of the total proven developed and undeveloped oil 
reserves (in millions of barrels). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Gas reserves RES_GAS Quantity of the total proven developed and undeveloped gas 
reserves (in billions of cubic feet). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
Market value of CEO 
shareholding 
CEO_CS Measured by the logarithm of 1 plus the market value of 
common shares held by the CEO at the end of each quarter. 
Thomson Reuters 
43 
 
Continued 
Table 1-Continued 
 
Variable definition Variable name Construction Data source 
# CEOs  stock options  CEO_OPT Number of CEO stock options (in thousands). Thomson Reuters 
Variables that proxy for Market conditions 
Oil expected return OIL_RET Measured by EሾR୲ሿ ൌ logሾF୲/S୲ሿ where F୲ and S୲ are 
respectively the oil prices of 12-month Futures contracts and the 
oil spot prices observed at the end of quarter t. 
Manually constructed 
Oil spot price OIL_SPOT Oil spot price represented by the WTI in the NYMEX. Bloomberg 
Gas expected return GAS_RET Measured by EሾR୲ሿ ൌ logሾF୲/S୲ሿ where F୲ and S୲ are 
respectively the gas prices of 12-month Futures contracts and 
the gas spot prices observed at the end of quarter t. 
Manually constructed 
Gas spot price GAS_SPOT Constructed as an average index established from principal 
locations’ indices in the United States (Gulf Coast, Henry Hub, 
etc.) 
Bloomberg 
Oil price volatility  OIL_VOL Historical volatility (standard deviation) using the spot price of 
the previous 60 days. 
Manually constructed 
Gas price volatility  GAS_VOL Historical volatility (standard deviation) using the spot price of 
the previous 60 days. 
Manually constructed 
Variables that proxy for the asset-liability management 
Weighted-average maturity 
of debt (in years) 
DEBT_MAT Calculated as the book value-weighted average maturities of 
debt that mature within one, two, three, four and five years. 
Manually constructed 
Expected life duration of oil 
and gas reserves (in years) 
RES_MAT_(OIL/GAS) Calculated by dividing the current quantity of oil (gas) 
developed reserves by the current annual oil (gas) production. 
Manually constructed 
Variables that proxy for hedging contract features 
Contract strike price STRIKE Measured by the average spot price during the quarter of the 
initiation of the hedging contract 
 
Contract moneyness MONEYNESS Calculated as the contract strike price minus the average spot 
price during the current quarter 
 
Variables that proxy for hedging substitutes 
Quick ratio Q_RATIO Cash and cash equivalents scaled by current liabilities. Compustat 
Book value of convertible 
debt 
BVCD Book value of convertible debt scaled by the book value of total 
assets. 
Compustat 
 
 
Table 2 
Weighted-average maturity by hedging instrument (in years) 
 
Hedging Instrument Obs % of use Mean Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile Min Max Std Dev 
Panel A: Gas hedgers 
Swap contracts 2255 45.58% 1.286 1.161 0.894 1.582 0.250 5 0.651 
Costless Collars 1840 37.19% 1.156 1.032 0.822 1.404 0.250 4.190 0.539 
Put options 522 10.55% 1.023 1 0.750 1.273 0.250 3.220 0.538 
Forwards or Futures 161 3.25% 0.856 0.914 0.616 1.002 0.250 1.942 0.330 
3-way Collars 169 3.42% 1.187 1.096 0.881 1.427 0.250 3.101 0.511 
Gas hedging portfolio 
maturity 
3137  1.222 1.111 0.906 1.478 0.250 5 0.559 
Panel B: Oil hedgers 
          
Swap contracts 1711 45.25% 1.227 1.061 0.750 1.530 0.250 3.758 0.644 
Costless Collars 1403 37.11% 1.221 1.050 0.799 1.500 0.250 4.439 0.621 
Put options 448 11.85% 1.083 1 0.750 1.416 0.250 2.970 0.548 
Forwards or Futures 105 2.78% 0.818 0.750 0.500 1 0.250 1.750 0.332 
3-way Collars 114 3.02% 1.448 1.230 0.855 1.840 0.250 4.212 0.878 
Oil hedging portfolio 
maturity 
2607  1.204 1.061 0.820 1.489 0.250 3.935 0.575 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for sample firms financial and operational characteristics 
This table provides financial and operational statistics for the 150 US oil and gas producers for the period 1998-2010. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; 
COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; DTD for distance-to-default; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of 
long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $); PROD_CV_OIL and 
PROD_CV_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively; COR_PQ_OIL and COR_PQ_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for 
oil and gas respectively; CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in MM$); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held by 
firm’s CEO (in 000); TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; 
DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_OIL and RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of proven oil and gas reserves (in years). 
Variable Obs Mean Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile Std Dev 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 6,006 0.224 0.075 0.041 0.129 3.619 
COR_CI_CF 6196 0.307 0.373 -0.015 0.693 0.452 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 5,686 2.234 2.052 1.323 2.862 1.361 
LEV 6,063 0.158 0.142 0.053 0.220 0.153 
DIS_COSTS 6298 2.347 0 0 0 16.957 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
PROD_CV_OIL 6,058 0.416 0.313 0.141 0.587 0.388 
COR_PQ_OIL 6,119 0.229 0.455 -0.287 0.723 0.587 
PROD_CV_GAS 6,078 0.408 0.303 0.146 0.582 0.359 
COR_PQ_GAS 6,112 0.154 0.230 -0.174 0.504 0.419 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
CEO_CS 6,326 28.983 1.125 0.000 11.563 152.159 
CEO_OPT 6,326 174.386 0.000 0.000 120.000 681.760 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage 
TLCF 6,066 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.438 
TAX_SAVE 6,160 0.052 0.048 0.029 0.070 0.051 
Variables that proxy for the asset-liability management 
DEBT_MAT 6326 2 2 0 3.349 1.640 
RES_MAT_OIL 6157 9.055 7.542 5.050 10.639 10.846 
RES_MAT_GAS 6180 9.506 7.476 5.206 10.439 10.657 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of oil and gas producers and market conditions by hedging maturity 
This table provides the mean and median values of firms’ financial and operational characteristics and market conditions according to the weighted-average 
maturity of the hedging portfolio. For each firm-quarter with hedging activity, a hedging portfolio maturity is classified as short-term maturity  if it is below 
one year ahead, a medium-term maturity if it is between one and two years ahead, and a long-term maturity if it exceeds two years ahead.  INV_OPP for 
investment opportunities; COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; DTD for distance-to-default; LEV for the leverage ratio 
measured by the sum of long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in 
$); PROD_CV_OIL and PROD_CV_GAS measure production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively; COR_PQ_OIL and COR_PQ_GAS measure the 
quantity-price correlation for oil and gas respectively; CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in MM$); CEO_OPT for the 
number of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected 
percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_OIL and RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of proven oil and 
gas reserves (in years); GAS_SPOT and OIL_SPOT are spot prices; GAS_VOL and OIL_VOL are historical volatilities of spot prices over the current quarter; 
GAS_RET and OIL_RET are oil and gas returns measured by log(12-month future price/spot price). Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test 
assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is constructed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported. 
Characteristics of oil and gas producers and market conditions by hedging maturity 
Short  
Maturity 
Medium 
Maturity 
Long  
Maturity 
Short vs.  
Long 
Medium vs.  
Long 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median 
p-Value 
(Mean) 
p-Value 
(Median) 
p-Value
(Mean) 
p-Value 
(Median)
Panel A: Gas hedgers 
Financial distress 
LEV 1287 0.183 0.160 1555 0.198 0.176 267 0.231 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.024 
DTD 1271 2.305 2.237 1516 2.402 2.312 250 2.615 2.379 0.002 0.019 0.036 0.173 
DIS_COSTS 1299 1.612 0 1569 1.339 0 269 2.586 0 0.129 0.000 0.045 0.000 
Underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 1284 0.098 0.078 1533 0.111 0.078 268 0.134 0.068 0.016 0.101 0.131 0.071 
COR_CI_CF 1299 0.418 0.502 1569 0.427 0.529 269 0.282 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Production characteristics 
PROD_CV_GAS 1299 0.346 0.266 1569 0.474 0.369 269 0.528 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.497 
COR_PQ_GAS 1299 0.207 0.306 1569 0.306 0.391 269 0.201 0.306 0.811 0.807 0.000 0.002 
Managerial risk aversion 
CEO_CS 1299 33.373 3.682 1569 52.285 6.381 269 46.969 12.917 0.146 0.000 0.565 0.000 
CEO_OPT 1299  203,532 20,000 1569 210,316 18,655 269 421,252 6,000 0.034 0.425 0.043 0.814 
Tax incentives 
TAX_SAVE 1287 0.048 0.046 1563 0.050 0.047 269 0.049 0.046 0.686 0.172 0.492 0.634 
TLCF 1287 0.069 0 1554 0.054 0 268 0.037 0 0.000 0.018 0.033 0.007 
Asset-liability management 
RES_MAT_GAS 1299 7.407 6.642 1569 8.609 7.728 269 10.872 8.826 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT_MAT 1299 2.147 2.200 1569 2.709 3 269 2.666 3 0.000 0.000 0.664 0.495 
Market conditions 
GAS_SPOT 1298 5.049 4.830 1566 5.598 5.530 269 5.357 5.050 0.084 0.070 0.171 0.075 
GAS_VOL 1298 0.714 0.468 1566 0.816 0.622 269 0.788 0.549 0.036 0.002 0.437 0.534 
GAS_RET 1298 0.121 0.100 1566 0.145 0.110 269 0.137 0.100 0.227 0.387 0.525 0.601 
 Panel B: Oil hedgers 
Financial distress 
LEV 1172 0.198 0.173 1169  0.189 0.169 250 0.175 0.163 0.003 0.042 0.046 0.045 
DTD 1151 2.341 2.240 1145 2.379 2.308 240 2.669 2.707 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIS_COSTS 1177 1.256 0 1173 1.661 0 250 0.899 0 0.451 0.913 0.139 0.585 
Underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 1161 0.093 0.068 1158 0.130 0.079  250 0.180 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.038 
COR_CI_CF 1180 0.405 0.486 1177 0.457 0.559 250 0.359 0.378 0.110 0.073 0.000 0.000 
Production characteristics 
PROD_CV_OIL 1176 0.374 0.282 1175 0.464 0.384 234 0.490 0.376 0.000 0.000 0.325 0.808 
COR_PQ_OIL 1180 0.281 0.509 1175 0.446 0.639 234 0.456 0.574 0.000 0.000 0.748 0.916 
Managerial  risk aversion 
CEO_CS 1180 57.791 3.951 1177 52.202 7.002 250 76.033 15.016 0.150 0.000 0.037 0.000 
CEO_OPT 1180 182,748 50,000 1177 194,666 7 250 448,562 3,212 0.024 0.055 0.035 0.445 
Tax Incentives 
TAX_SAVE 1173 0.048 0.047 1174 0.052 0.048 250 0.047 0.046 0.478 0.429 0.011   0.071 
TLCF 1172 0.091 0 1169 0.067 0 250 0.034 0 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 
Asset-liability management 
RES_MAT_OIL 1180 7.883 6.971 1177 8.599 8.149 250 11.078 9.972 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT_MAT 1180 2.331 2.636 1177 2.715 3 250 2.870 3.037 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.233 
Market  conditions 
OIL_SPOT 1179 46.648 32.500 1177 62.638 65.870 250 73.421 70.610 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OIL_VOL 1179 3.168 2.233 1177 4.189 3.306 250 4.930 3.654 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
OIL_RET 1179 -0.024 -0.023 1177 0.006 0.016 250 0.019 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
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Table 5 
Contract features by hedging maturity 
This table provides the mean and median values of the hedging instruments features (i.e., moneyness and strike price) according to its weighted-average 
maturity. Hedging instruments are swap contracts, put options, and costless collars. Strike price is measured by the average spot price during the quarter of 
initiation of the hedging contract. Moneyness is calculated as the contract strike price minus the average spot price during the current quarter. For each 
instrument, a hedging maturity is classified as short-term maturity  if it is below one year ahead, a medium-term maturity if it is between one and two years 
ahead, and a long-term maturity if it exceeds two years ahead. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of 
medians is constructed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported.  
Contract features by hedging maturity 
Short  
Maturity 
Medium 
Maturity 
Long  
Maturity 
Short vs.  
Long 
Medium vs.  
Long 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median 
p-value 
(Mean) 
p-value 
(Median) 
p-value
(Mean)
p-value 
(Median)
Panel A: Gas hedgers 
Swap contracts 
MONEYNESS 903 -0.187 0 1069 -0.029 0 282 -0.127 0 0.580 0.171 0.344 0.176 
STRIKE 903 5.054 5.261 1069 5.506 5.511 282 5.108 5.261 0.744 0.532 0.012 0.011 
Put options 
MONEYNESS 306 -0.005 0 184 0.121 0 27 -0.480 0 0.108 0.395 0.043 0.018 
STRIKE 306 5.263 5.407 184 5.849 6.114 27 4.865 4.706 0.273 0.369 0.011 0.028 
Costless collars 
MONEYNESS 869 0.040 0 859 0.052 0 111 0.777 0 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 
STRIKE 869 5.491 5.484 859 6.203 6.164 111 7.457 7.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Oil hedgers 
Swap contracts 
MONEYNESS 794 -2.689 -0.622 706 -2.681 0 211 -5.186 0 0.019 0.300 0.031 0.103 
STRIKE 794 41.656 31.155 706 56.059 58.095 211 65.592 64.952 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Put options 
MONEYNESS 230 -1.428 0 188 0.760 0 27 2.043 0 0.389 0.143 0.751 0.514 
STRIKE 230 49.356 38.314 188 63.068 60.048 27 66.512 59.956 0.011 0.013 0.599 0.675 
Costless collars 
MONEYNESS 663 -2.676 -0.263 589 -3.016 0 151 5.298 0 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.015 
STRIKE 663 50.717 48.305 589 60.551 60.048 151 77.451 63.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 6 
Maturity structure by gas hedgers 
This table provides the two-step SYS-GMM results for the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap contracts, put 
options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of gas hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; 
COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt 
in current liabilities plus one-half long term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; DTD for 
distance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for the distance to default squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_GAS 
measures gas production uncertainty; COR_PQ_GAS measures the gas quantity-price correlation; GAS_VOL for gas price volatility; 
GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month future price/gas sport price); GAS_SPOT and GAS_SPOT_SQUARED are for gas 
spot price and gas price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price minus the average spot price during the current 
quarter; STRIKE is the contract’s strike price; TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the 
expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of proven oil 
and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number 
of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio (Appendix A); LAG_1 is the dependent variable first lag; 
LAG_2 is the dependent variable second lag (used when there is second-order serial correlation in the error term). Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and incorporate the Windmeijer (2005) correction, in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% 
level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar
             
INV_OPP 0.3292***  0.3468***  0.2735**  0.3192***  0.0695  0.0634  
 (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.114)  (0.108)  (0.086)  (0.079)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.0437  -0.0026  -0.1851**  -0.2055**  -0.0028  0.0599 
  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.081)  (0.099)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
LEV 1.3438***   1.4572*** 1.3907***   3.2410*** 0.8867***   1.0542*** 
 (0.280)   (0.281) (0.424)   (0.600) (0.184)   (0.175) 
LEV_SQUARE -0.9482***   -1.1349*** -1.3725   -5.4469*** -0.5349***   -0.6324*** 
 (0.360)   (0.402) (0.866)   (1.456) (0.130)   (0.170) 
DTD   0.0994***    0.0115    0.1499***  
   (0.029)    (0.050)    (0.032)  
DTD_SQUARE   -0.0087*    0.0062    -0.0237***  
   (0.005)    (0.008)    (0.006)  
DIS_COSTS  0.0041  0.0028  0.0069  0.0081*  0.0014  0.0001 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
PROD_CV_GAS 0.0734  0.1487**  0.0923  0.0765  0.1273***  0.1439***  
 (0.051)  (0.057)  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.047)  (0.052)  
COR_PQ_GAS 0.0550  -0.0073  0.0071  0.0110  0.0940**  0.0031  
 (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.083)  (0.078)  (0.042)  (0.039)  
GAS_VOL 0.0555***  0.0541***  0.1128***  0.1287***  0.0482**  0.0425**  
 (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
GAS_RET -0.1307*  -0.1572**  -0.4896***  -0.4689***  -0.2587***  -0.2710***  
 (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.142)  (0.130)  (0.070)  (0.076)  
GAS_SPOT  0.1309***    0.1457***    0.0997***   
  (0.016)    (0.029)    (0.017)   
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE  -0.0080***    -0.0074***    -0.0047***   
  (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)   
MONEYNESS 0.0144*  0.0209***  0.0158  0.0161  0.0109  0.0142*  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
STRIKE    0.0299***    0.0384***    0.0222*** 
    (0.007)    (0.011)    (0.007) 
TLCF  -0.3411***  -0.3849***  -0.3462***  -0.4941***  -0.0611*  -0.1061** 
  (0.062)  (0.142)  (0.050)  (0.178)  (0.036)  (0.041) 
TAX_SAVE -0.0491  0.2914  0.0389  1.9730**  0.4577  0.7561**  
 (0.140)  (0.235)  (0.848)  (0.764)  (0.409)  (0.340)  
DEBT_MAT  0.0396***  0.0368***  0.0082  -0.0146  0.0307***  0.0337*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
RES_MAT_GAS 0.0184***  0.0188***  0.0212***  0.0208***  0.0228***  0.0200***  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
CEO_CS  0.1218  0.1756  -0.2095  0.2573  0.1841  0.1322 
  (0.114)  (0.154)  (0.330)  (0.326)  (0.148)  (0.121) 
CEO_OPT  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0002***  -0.0001** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMR 0.1829*** 0.1002** 0.1202** 0.2569*** 0.1225* 0.0851 0.1181* 0.2251*** 0.1288*** 0.0583 0.0597 0.1734*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.063) (0.065) (0.083) (0.061) (0.082) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) 
LAG_1 0.5597*** 0.5836*** 0.5834*** 0.5742*** 0.4892*** 0.5592*** 0.5120*** 0.4766*** 0.5816*** 0.6043*** 0.5918*** 0.6044*** 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.051) (0.050) (0.080) (0.094) (0.074) (0.081) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) 
LAG_2    -0.0289         
    (0.022)         
             
Observations 2,123 2,129 2,096 2,108 480 485 478 480 1,726 1,746 1,699 1,745 
Number of firms 99 100 99 99 44 49 43 44 93 95 93 94 
Number of instruments 63 61 63 62 63 61 63 62 63 61 63 62 
F statistic 409.4175 705.0217 428.2656 433.7338 173.8287 182.3584 227.4729 200.8200 412.9824 570.3112 601.2629 575.2583 
p value F statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic 63.8114 53.8975 62.5987 59.8964 36.6077 30.6516 36.9887 33.0220 60.9116 52.6989 56.9287 60.2093 
p value of Hansen statistic 0.1074 0.3641 0.1279 0.1595 0.9356 0.9893 0.9295 0.9761 0.1613 0.4082 0.2640 0.1769 
AR(2) test statistic -1.4614 -1.3744 -1.6156 -0.7854 -0.6087 -0.9605 -0.3671 -1.4434 -1.3989 -0.8421 -1.3168 -1.5502 
p value of AR(2) statistic 0.1439 0.1693 0.1062 0.4322 0.5427 0.3368 0.7136 0.1489 0.1618 0.3997 0.1879 0.1211 
Sigma_e 0.3393 0.4425 0.3471 0.3459 0.3049 0.4605 0.3100 0.3164 0.3175 0.4135 0.3194 0.3277 
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Table 7 
Maturity structure by oil hedgers 
This table provides the two-step SYS-GMM results for the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap contracts, put 
options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of oil hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; 
COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred;  LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term 
debt in current liabilities plus one-half long term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; 
DTD for distance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for distance-to-default squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_OIL 
measures oil production uncertainty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the oil quantity-price correlation, OIL_VOL for oil price volatility; OIL_RET 
for oil return as measured by log(oil 12-month future price/oil sport price); OIL_SPOT and OIL_SPOT_SQUARED are for oil spot price and 
oil price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price minus the average spot price during the current quarter; STRIKE is the 
contract’s strike price; TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of 
tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_OIL are the expected life of proven oil and gas reserves (in 
years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held 
by firm’s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio (Appendix A); LAG_1 is the dependent variable first lag; LAG_2 is the dependent 
variable second lag (used when there are second order serial correlation in the error term). Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
incorporate the Windmeijer (2005) correction, in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar
             
INV_OPP 0.2623**  0.2200**  0.5839**  0.5923**  0.1001*  0.0916*  
 (0.129)  (0.110)  (0.222)  (0.235)  (0.052)  (0.052)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.1294***  -0.0818*  0.0487  0.0533  0.0213  0.0302 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.076)  (0.094)  (0.052)  (0.059) 
LEV 0.5090*   0.8594*** 1.5182*   1.6283** 1.1577***   0.8237*** 
 (0.265)   (0.256) (0.803)   (0.760) (0.348)   (0.208) 
LEV_SQUARE -0.2940   -0.7017** -1.5120   -1.3516 -1.4545***   -0.9989*** 
 (0.402)   (0.349) (2.053)   (1.702) (0.522)   (0.292) 
DTD   0.0729**    0.2709***    0.1614***  
   (0.029)    (0.075)    (0.055)  
DTD_SQUARE   -0.0049    -0.0474***    -0.0230**  
   (0.003)    (0.015)    (0.010)  
DIS_COSTS  0.0011  -0.0006  0.0146***  0.0103***  0.0003  0.0005 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
PROD_CV_OIL 0.1090*  0.1260*  0.0089  0.0109  -0.0404  -0.0797  
 (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.119)  (0.104)  (0.062)  (0.059)  
COR_PQ_OIL 0.0590  0.0001  0.0217  -0.0442  0.0983**  0.0427  
 (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.048)  (0.046)  
OIL_VOL 0.0189***  0.0206***  0.0159**  0.0205**  0.0133**  0.0170***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
OIL_RET -0.0313  0.0165  -0.3799  -0.3938  -0.2188  -0.0051  
 (0.195)  (0.209)  (0.495)  (0.504)  (0.230)  (0.215)  
OIL_SPOT  0.0149***    0.0043    0.0080***   
  (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
OIL_SPOT_SQUARE  -0.0001***    -0.0000    -0.0000**   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
MONEYNESS 0.0028**  0.0033***  0.0015  0.0031  0.0037***  0.0044***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
STRIKE    0.0057***    0.0037***    0.0033*** 
    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
TLCF  -0.3940***  -0.5680***  -0.2640***  -0.4791***  -0.0531  -0.0813 
  (0.082)  (0.134)  (0.062)  (0.163)  (0.059)  (0.052) 
TAX_SAVE 0.1945  0.1802  0.1319  0.9001  0.1094  0.0787  
 (0.154)  (0.140)  (0.612)  (0.583)  (0.286)  (0.273)  
DEBT_MAT  0.0416***  0.0420***  0.0280  -0.0006  0.0310***  0.0260** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0311***  0.0272***  0.0119**  0.0052  0.0182***  0.0161***  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004)  
CEO_CS  -0.1633  -0.0628  -0.3542  -0.3388  -0.0665  -0.1324 
  (0.137)  (0.139)  (0.318)  (0.343)  (0.140)  (0.146) 
CEO_OPT  0.0002*  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMR 0.1311** 0.1470** 0.1049* 0.2848*** 0.1382** 0.2096*** 0.0121 0.1800*** 0.2054*** 0.1265** 0.1797** 0.1946*** 
 (0.059) (0.071) (0.060) (0.062) (0.059) (0.066) (0.052) (0.052) (0.068) (0.049) (0.068) (0.044) 
LAG_1 0.5630*** 0.5548*** 0.5728*** 0.5490*** 0.4645*** 0.5872*** 0.4760*** 0.5211*** 0.5858*** 0.6228*** 0.5745*** 0.6256*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.063) (0.062) (0.084) (0.076) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) 
LAG_2 -0.0496** -0.0696*** -0.0432** -0.0529**         
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)         
             
Observations 1,593 1,608 1,572 1,608 402 417 393 414 1,331 1,351 1,311 1,351 
Number of firms 88 89 88 89 36 40 35 37 81 81 81 81 
Number of instruments 63 61 63 62 57 57 57 56 63 61 63 62 
F statistic 293.9642 413.6701 255.7297 280.9298 128.4730 176.0464 102.0687 336.8433 280.2979 444.6558 275.8100 318.6617 
p value F statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic 51.8717 51.3504 55.6423 54.2101 29.0451 28.2022 27.3456 35.4909 59.4069 46.4226 56.9199 53.5233 
p value of Hansen statistic 0.4007 0.4206 0.2708 0.3170 0.9688 0.9865 0.9825 0.8441 0.1960 0.6558 0.2642 0.3777 
AR(2) test statistic -1.0896 0.1353 -1.2967 -0.7639 0.5991 1.4030 1.0248 1.2104 0.8288 0.2945 0.9272 1.0881 
p value of AR(2) statistic 0.2759 0.8923 0.1947 0.4449 0.5491 0.1606 0.3055 0.2261 0.4072 0.7684 0.3538 0.2766 
Sigma_e 0.3144 0.4310 0.3160 0.3163 0.3038 0.4969 0.3079 0.3177 0.3374 0.4834 0.3324 0.3533 
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Table 8 
Maturity choice at the inception of hedging contracts by gas hedgers 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions of the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap 
contracts, put options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of gas hedgers. INV_OPP for investment 
opportunities; COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of 
long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio 
squared; DTD for distance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for distance-to-default squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); 
PROD_CV_GAS measures gas production uncertainty; COR_PQ_GAS measures the gas quantity-price correlation; GAS_VOL for gas price 
volatility; GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month future price/gas sport price); GAS_SPOT and GAS_SPOT_SQUARED 
are for gas spot price and gas price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price minus the average spot price during the 
current quarter; STRIKE is the contract’s strike price; TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE 
for the expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of 
proven oil and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for 
the number of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio (Appendix A). Robust standard errors using Huber-
White-Sandwich estimator are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar
             
INV_OPP 0.0026  0.0146  -0.0512  -0.0371  0.1862**  0.1876**  
 (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.140)  (0.151)  (0.082)  (0.079)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.2297***  -0.2398***  -0.4763***  -0.4721***  -0.0388  -0.0025 
  (0.063)  (0.071)  (0.120)  (0.137)  (0.055)  (0.058) 
LEV -0.5737*   -0.9896** 1.9823**   1.5209 0.4274   0.7591** 
 (0.343)   (0.408) (0.784)   (1.168) (0.329)   (0.357) 
LEV_SQUARE 1.0634***   1.1176*** -2.5490**   -2.8874 -0.3952   -0.6584* 
 (0.306)   (0.333) (1.280)   (2.469) (0.320)   (0.359) 
DTD   -0.0023    -0.1624    0.0425  
   (0.040)    (0.119)    (0.064)  
DTD_SQUARE   0.0025    0.0253    -0.0085  
   (0.006)    (0.021)    (0.010)  
DIS_COSTS  0.0057**  0.0055**  0.0036  0.0056  0.0015  0.0010 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
PROD_CV_GAS 0.0294  0.0257  0.2925**  0.2413**  0.2699***  0.2538***  
 (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.114)  (0.121)  (0.057)  (0.060)  
COR_PQ_GAS -0.1624**  -0.1725**  -0.1216  -0.1775*  0.0628  0.0392  
 (0.072)  (0.067)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.053)  (0.052)  
GAS_VOL -0.0259  -0.0364  0.0072  -0.0135  0.0377  0.0317  
 (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.038)  (0.038)  
GAS_RET 0.0015  -0.0392  -0.1774  -0.1942  -0.0055  -0.0033  
 (0.132)  (0.126)  (0.170)  (0.163)  (0.100)  (0.099)  
GAS_SPOT  -0.0159    0.0524    0.0654**   
  (0.035)    (0.040)    (0.027)   
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE  0.0010    -0.0028    -0.0032   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
STRIKE    -0.0141    0.0260**    0.0278*** 
    (0.010)    (0.012)    (0.009) 
TLCF  -0.5876***  -0.5165***  -0.7963***  -0.6928***  -0.0835  -0.1434 
  (0.142)  (0.147)  (0.198)  (0.208)  (0.152)  (0.152) 
TAX_SAVE -1.4783*  -1.5711*  -0.1894  -0.3458  0.2650  0.2519  
 (0.873)  (0.841)  (0.878)  (0.831)  (0.201)  (0.214)  
DEBT_MAT  0.0152  0.0188  0.0068  -0.0029  0.0242**  0.0229** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
RES_MAT_GAS 0.0142***  0.0120***  0.0320***  0.0281***  0.0128**  0.0122**  
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
CEO_CS  0.2019  0.1969  -0.0600  0.1344  0.4796**  0.4417** 
  (0.258)  (0.269)  (0.297)  (0.360)  (0.205)  (0.205) 
CEO_OPT  0.0007  0.0008  -0.0001  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMR -0.3736*** -0.2885*** -0.3237*** -0.3941*** -0.0970 -0.3959*** -0.3236*** -0.2614 -0.3176*** -0.2978*** -0.3778*** -0.2299*** 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.071) (0.112) (0.108) (0.095) (0.158) (0.070) (0.073) (0.065) (0.080) 
CONSTANT 1.6506*** 1.6762*** 1.5977*** 1.8711*** 0.6523*** 1.4443*** 1.3201*** 1.2623*** 1.0725*** 1.1194*** 1.1399*** 1.0577*** 
 (0.112) (0.124) (0.115) (0.147) (0.194) (0.181) (0.212) (0.261) (0.098) (0.096) (0.109) (0.121) 
             
Observations 733 735 726 735 168 168 167 163 603 608 597 607 
R-squared 0.0799 0.0825 0.0649 0.0948 0.2083 0.2047 0.1947 0.1898 0.1236 0.0872 0.1220 0.0888 
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Table 9 
Maturity choice at the inception of hedging contracts by oil hedgers 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions of the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap 
contracts, put options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of oil hedgers. INV_OPP for investment 
opportunities; COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of 
long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio 
squared; DTD for distance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for distance-to-default squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); 
PROD_CV_OIL measures oil production uncertainty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the oil quantity-price correlation; OIL_VOL for oil price 
volatility; OIL_RET for oil return as measured by log(oil 12-month future price/oil sport price); OIL_SPOT and OIL_SPOT_SQUARED are 
for oil spot price and oil price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price minus the average spot price during the current 
quarter; STRIKE is the contract’s strike price; TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the 
expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_OIL are the expected life of proven oil 
and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number 
of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio (Appendix A). Robust standard errors using Huber-White-
Sandwich estimator are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables swap swap swap swap put put put put collar collar collar collar
             
INV_OPP 0.1860  0.2165  0.3426**  0.3949***  0.2728***  0.2879***  
 (0.154)  (0.142)  (0.157)  (0.145)  (0.104)  (0.104)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.2169***  -0.2177***  -0.1492  -0.1486  -0.0184  -0.0360 
  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.124)  (0.125)  (0.075)  (0.086) 
LEV -1.3732***   -0.2853 -1.8256   -0.2747 -0.3317   -0.3262 
 (0.403)   (0.378) (1.277)   (1.569) (0.425)   (0.478) 
LEV_SQUARE 1.0744***   -0.0052 3.5507   1.2990 0.0682   0.1122 
 (0.377)   (0.342) (3.041)   (3.217) (0.500)   (0.543) 
DTD   0.1393***    0.2988***    0.1412**  
   (0.035)    (0.101)    (0.065)  
DTD_SQUARE   -0.0098***    -0.0515***    -0.0200*  
   (0.003)    (0.015)    (0.010)  
DIS_COSTS  0.0018  0.0029*  0.0085*  0.0119***  -0.0003  0.0007 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
PROD_CV_OIL 0.3939***  0.3406***  -0.1638  -0.1586  -0.1665*  -0.1750*  
 (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.125)  (0.112)  (0.095)  (0.094)  
COR_PQ_OIL -0.0259  0.0060  -0.0359  -0.0879  0.1208***  0.1039**  
 (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.088)  (0.079)  (0.047)  (0.048)  
OIL_VOL 0.0126  0.0279**  0.0155  0.0294**  0.0032  0.0094  
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
OIL_RET 1.0026***  0.9922***  -0.1797  0.1297  1.3909***  1.5355***  
 (0.359)  (0.348)  (0.562)  (0.589)  (0.419)  (0.424)  
OIL_SPOT  0.0222***    0.0058    0.0105**   
  (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.004)   
OIL_SPOT_SQUARE  -0.0001***    -0.0000    -0.0000   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
STRIKE    0.0100***    0.0039**    0.0049*** 
    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001) 
TLCF  -0.4943***  -0.4607***  -0.6377***  -0.6094**  -0.2474***  -0.2038*** 
  (0.133)  (0.136)  (0.215)  (0.261)  (0.079)  (0.077) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0044  -0.0476  0.8006  0.6848  -0.1129  -0.7660  
 (0.208)  (0.211)  (1.408)  (1.555)  (1.037)  (1.001)  
DEBT_MAT  0.0212  0.0196  0.0128  0.0093  0.0296*  0.0328** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0272***  0.0234***  0.0132**  0.0108**  0.0051  0.0039  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
CEO_CS  -0.1867  -0.1990  0.0916  -0.0315  0.0717  0.1074 
  (0.229)  (0.230)  (0.673)  (0.696)  (0.321)  (0.323) 
CEO_OPT  0.0006  0.0007  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004  0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMR -0.2008** 0.0349 -0.0675 0.0230 -0.4435*** -0.3672*** -0.3348*** -0.3689** -0.2096*** -0.0748 -0.1387* -0.1324 
 (0.091) (0.087) (0.083) (0.094) (0.121) (0.105) (0.086) (0.147) (0.077) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) 
CONSTANT 1.2574*** 0.6425*** 0.6798*** 0.9784*** 1.5144*** 1.3262*** 0.9009*** 1.3511*** 1.4490*** 0.8816*** 1.1732*** 1.1215*** 
 (0.117) (0.115) (0.121) (0.133) (0.241) (0.198) (0.215) (0.322) (0.123) (0.127) (0.143) (0.144) 
             
Observations 562 570 557 570 128 132 126 129 433 436 430 436 
R-squared 0.1874 0.2042 0.1950 0.2045 0.2062 0.2111 0.2643 0.2148 0.0952 0.1078 0.1129 0.1046 
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Table 10 
Determinants of early termination of hedging contracts by gas hedgers 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional time-series PROBIT regressions of the determinants of the early termination of swap contracts, put 
options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of gas hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; 
COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt 
in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; 
DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_GAS measures gas production uncertainty; COR_PQ_GAS measures the gas quantity-
price correlation; GAS_VOL for gas price volatility; GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month future price/gas sport price); 
GAS_SPOT and GAS_SPOT_SQUARED are for gas spot price and gas price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price 
minus the average spot price during the current quarter; STRIKE is the contract’s strike price; REMAINING_MAT  is the remaining maturity 
at the termination date (in years); TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in 
years); RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of proven oil and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held 
by firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); Robust standard errors using Huber-
White-Sandwich are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Swap Swap Put Put Collar Collar 
       
OPP_INV 0.2358  -0.3690  0.0856  
 (0.284)  (0.790)  (0.273)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.0556  0.1147  -0.1326 
  (0.115)  (0.221)  (0.138) 
LEV -2.9846***  -4.1255*  -0.5718  
 (0.795)  (2.176)  (0.863)  
LEV_SQUARE 1.8096***  4.4556  0.5257  
 (0.664)  (3.985)  (0.628)  
DIS_COSTS  -0.0083  -0.0161  0.0040 
  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.004) 
PROD_CV_GAS 0.0479  -0.4728  -0.1927  
 (0.144)  (0.291)  (0.154)  
COR_PQ_GAS -0.1553  -0.2885  -0.2564*  
 (0.144)  (0.182)  (0.145)  
GAS_VOL -0.5007***  -0.1973  -0.2868**  
 (0.144)  (0.204)  (0.137)  
GAS_RET 0.1737  -0.1456  0.2358  
 (0.328)  (0.388)  (0.315)  
GAS_SPOT  -0.1848***  -0.3378***  -0.3630*** 
  (0.068)  (0.108)  (0.081) 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE  0.0061  0.0223***  0.0195*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
MONYNESS  -0.1084  -0.2623  0.2060 
  (0.185)  (0.404)  (0.164) 
REMAINING_MAT -0.4496*  -1.2286***  -1.1152***  
 (0.261)  (0.396)  (0.299)  
TAX_SAVE  -0.4619  -0.4984  -0.3618 
  (1.036)  (4.009)  (0.834) 
DEBT_MAT  -0.0580*  -0.0016  -0.0345 
  (0.030)  (0.051)  (0.033) 
RES_MAT_GAS 0.0106  -0.0073  0.0146*  
 (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.009)  
CEO_CS  -1.7609  -13.9335*  -3.0740* 
  (1.456)  (7.343)  (1.864) 
CEO_OPT  -0.0007  0.0009  -0.0039* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
CONSTANT -1.1494*** -0.7850*** -0.5415 -0.3609 -1.5494*** -0.2803 
 (0.167) (0.210) (0.354) (0.385) (0.232) (0.251) 
       
Observations 2,312 2,342 559 564 1,865 1,905 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0762 0.0569 0.2174 0.0883 0.1527 0.1002 
Chi-squared 34.5827 45.6079 44.9633 16.3846 32.6056 45.0865 
Significance 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0593 0.0002 0.0000 
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Table 11 
Determinants of early termination of hedging contracts by oil hedgers 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional time-series PROBIT regressions of the determinants of the early termination of swap contracts, put 
options and costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of oil hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; 
COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt 
in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; 
DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_OIL measures oil production uncertainty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the oil quantity-
price correlation; OIL_VOL for oil price volatility; OIL_RET for oil return as measured by log(oil 12-month futures price/oil sport price); 
OIL_SPOT and OIL_SPOT_SQUARED are for oil spot price and oil price squared;  MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike price 
minus the average spot price during the current quarter; STRIKE is the contract’s strike price; REMAINING_MAT  is the remaining maturity 
at the termination date (in years); TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in 
years); RES_MAT_OIL is the expected life of proven oil and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by 
firm’s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000); Robust standard errors using Huber-
White-Sandwich are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Swap Swap Put Put Collar Collar 
       
OPP_INV -0.3025  0.1810  0.2939  
 (0.446)  (0.424)  (0.241)  
COR_CI_CF  -0.0697  0.3345  0.0397 
  (0.147)  (0.259)  (0.138) 
LEV -3.2636***  -3.2577  -2.3780**  
 (1.109)  (3.305)  (1.043)  
LEV_SQUARE 2.6593***  2.4391  1.9671  
 (0.931)  (7.625)  (1.219)  
DIS_COSTS  -0.0302  -0.0131  0.0029 
  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
PROD_CV_OIL 0.0381  -0.0322  -0.3278  
 (0.206)  (0.414)  (0.208)  
COR_PQ_OIL -0.2531**  -0.3286*  -0.3523***  
 (0.127)  (0.183)  (0.116)  
OIL_VOL -0.1040**  -0.0170  -0.1482**  
 (0.053)  (0.040)  (0.059)  
OIL_RET 3.0460***  1.3630  1.9779  
 (0.921)  (1.426)  (1.214)  
OIL_SPOT  -0.0441***  -0.0290***  -0.0463*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
OIL_SPOT_SQUARE  0.0002***  0.0002**  0.0002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MONYNESS  -0.4600***  -0.0167  -0.0452 
  (0.097)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
REMAINING_MAT -0.8982***  -1.0269**  -0.8855***  
 (0.285)  (0.456)  (0.282)  
TAX_SAVE  0.9225  6.3143*  1.1954 
  (0.890)  (3.477)  (1.130) 
DEBT_MAT  -0.0075  -0.2048***  -0.0156 
  (0.039)  (0.062)  (0.034) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0186  -0.0957  -0.0152  
 (0.012)  (0.064)  (0.015)  
CEO_CS  -1.2290  -1.0270  -1.0966 
  (1.137)  (2.493)  (0.709) 
CEO_OPT  -0.0008  0.0006  -0.0025 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
CONSTANT -1.0042*** -0.4612* -0.2718 -0.6973* -0.5360* -0.1093 
 (0.256) (0.264) (0.686) (0.382) (0.275) (0.239) 
       
Observations 1,747 1,792 446 471 1,435 1,471 
Pseudo-R squared 0.1385 0.3535 0.2079 0.1282 0.1570 0.1770 
Chi-squared 37.2153 108.8693 20.0476 25.2569 34.1545 73.2886 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0176 0.0027 0.0001 0.0000 
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Table 12 
Effect of hedging maturity on stock return and volatility sensitivity 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects regressions of the effect of hedging strategy choice on firm’s return and risk. 
The dependent variables are (i) the total stock rate of return for firm i in month t (Panel A), and (ii) the total stock risk measured by the 
annualized standard deviation of stock daily returns for firm i during month t (Panel B). R_MKT is the monthly rate of return in the S&P500 
index. R_OIL is the monthly rate of change of the NYMEX near-month futures contract for oil. R_GAS is the monthly rate of change of the 
NYMEX near-month futures contract for natural gas. SIG_MKT is the annualized standard deviation of the market index daily returns during 
the month t. SIG_OIL and SIG_GAS are the annualized standard deviations of the oil (gas) daily returns during the month t (e.g., R_OIL and 
R_GAS). HEDG_PORT_MAT is the remaining maturity of the hedging portfolio observed at the end of the previous month T-1. SWAP_MAT, 
PUT_MAT, COLLAR_MAT are the remaining maturities observed at the end of the previous month t-1. RES_MVE stands for the lagged value 
of the ratio of discounted dollar value of oil (gas) developed reserves divided by the market value of equity MKT_VALUE measured by the 
logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (e.g., closing price at the end of the month multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding). LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half 
long-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets; Q_RATIO for the quick ratio measured by the book value of cash and equivalent of 
cash scaled by the book value of current liabilities; DTD for distance-to-default; IMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio for oil hedgers and gas 
hedgers respectively coming from the Heckman first-step (Appendix A). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering 
using Huber-White-Sandwich estimator, are in parentheses.  ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
 
 Panel A 
Return Sensitivity 
Panel B 
Volatility Sensitivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Gas   
Hedgers 
Oil 
Hedgers  
Gas 
Hedgers 
Oil 
Hedgers 
Gas 
Hedgers 
Oil 
Hedgers 
Gas 
Hedgers 
Oil 
Hedgers 
         
(R/SIG)_MKT 1.0155*** 1.0723*** 1.0143*** 1.0700*** 1.2699*** 1.3036*** 1.2679*** 1.3037*** 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.053) (0.058) 
(R/SIG)_OIL 0.2730*** 0.3190*** 0.2743*** 0.2806*** 0.2081*** 0.1944*** 0.2082*** 0.2215*** 
 (0.023) (0.056) (0.023) (0.045) (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.049) 
(R/SIG)_GAS 0.2418*** 0.1916*** 0.2152*** 0.1920*** 0.0250 0.0459*** 0.0408** 0.0458*** 
 (0.042) (0.016) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
         
HEDG_PORT_MAT  x  -0.0791*** -0.0562   0.0170 0.0182   
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS) (0.023) (0.037)   (0.015) (0.029)   
         
SWAP_MAT  x    -0.0410*** -0.0258   0.0092 0.0125 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)   (0.016) (0.028)   (0.012) (0.030) 
PUT_MAT  x    -0.0273 0.0474   -0.0301 0.0036 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)   (0.027) (0.061)   (0.022) (0.045) 
COLLAR_MAT  x    -0.0401** -0.0262   0.0015 -0.0230 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)   (0.019) (0.027)   (0.013) (0.023) 
         
RES_MVE (OIL/GAS)  x 0.0623*** 0.0433** 0.0621*** 0.0433**     
R_(OIL/GAS) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)     
         
MKT_VALUE     0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV     0.5839*** 0.5250*** 0.5829*** 0.5169*** 
     (0.084) (0.106) (0.084) (0.105) 
DTD     -0.0797*** -0.0823*** -0.0801*** -0.0827***
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Q_RATIO     -0.0213*** -0.0212** -0.0206*** -0.0207** 
     (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
IMR 0.0080 -0.0014 0.0077 -0.0011 0.1145*** 0.0895** 0.1112*** 0.0826* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.046) 
CONSTANT 0.0059 0.0133** 0.0060 0.0131** 0.1920*** 0.1976*** 0.1952*** 0.2030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.049) 
         
Obs (firm-month) 8,581 7,145 8,581 7,145 8,582 7,150 8,582 7,150 
R-squared (within) 0.1840 0.1883 0.1838 0.1884 0.4718 0.4992 0.4720 0.4995 
Number of clusters 106 99 106 99 106 99 106 99 
F statistic 164.2872 131.2653 125.1299 100.1854 116.2512 114.0222 100.3655 95.3091 
Rho 0.0381 0.0325 0.0383 0.0326 0.2148 0.2099 0.2157 0.2103 
Sigma_U 0.0300 0.0275 0.0300 0.0275 0.1266 0.1221 0.1269 0.1222 
Sigma_E 0.1505 0.1498 0.1506 0.1498 0.2421 0.2369 0.2420 0.2369 
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Figure 1 
Non-monotonic relationship between hedging maturity and leverage for gas hedgers 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ ൌ ߙ ൈ ܮܧܸ ൅ 	ߚ ൈ	ܮܧܸ	ଶ 
with ߙ and ߚ coming from the estimation of our base model SYS-GMM in table 6. The coefficients ߙ and ߚ equal 1.45 
and -1.13 for swap contracts, 3.24 and -5.44 for put options, and 1.05 and -0.63 for costless collars (see Table 6 
Columns 4, 8 and 12). For Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), ߙ and ߚ equal 0.70 and -0.69 (see Table 15, pp.40 from Fehle 
and Tsyplakov (2005)). 
 
 
Figure 2 
Non-monotonic relationship between hedging maturity and leverage for oil hedgers 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ ൌ ߙ ൈ ܮܧܸ ൅ 	ߚ ൈ	ܮܧܸ	ଶ 
with ߙ and ߚ coming from the estimation of our base model SYS-GMM in Table 7. The coefficients ߙ and ߚ equal 0.86 
and -0.70 for swap contracts, 1.63 and -1.35 for put options, and 0.82 and -1.00 for costless collars (see Table 7 
Columns 4, 8 and 12). For Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), ߙ and ߚ equal 0.70 and -0.69 (see Table 15, pp.40 from Fehle 
and Tsyplakov (2005)). 
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Figure 3 
Non-monotonic relationship between hedging maturity and gas spot prices for gas hedgers 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ ൌ ߙ ൈ ܩܣܵ_ܱܵܲܶ ൅ 	ߚ ൈ
	ܩܣܵ_ܱܵܲܶ	ଶ with ߙ and ߚ coming from the estimation of our base model SYS-GMM in Table 6. The coefficients ߙ 
and ߚ equal 0.131 and -0.008 for swap contracts, 0.146 and -0.007 for put options, and 0.100 and -0.005 for costless 
collars (see Table 6 Columns 2, 6 and 10).  
 
 
Figure 4 
Non-monotonic relationship between hedging maturity and oil spot prices for oil hedgers 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ ൌ ߙ ൈ ܱܫܮ_ܱܵܲܶ ൅ 	ߚ ൈ
	ܱܫܮ_ܱܵܲܶ	ଶ with ߙ and ߚ coming from the estimation of our base model SYS-GMM in Table 7. The coefficients ߙ 
and ߚ equal 0.015 and -0.0001 for swap contracts, 0.0043 and -0.00000185 for put options, and 0.008 and -0.00004 for 
costless collars (see Table 7 Columns 2, 6 and 10).  
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Table A.I: First Step of the Two-Step Heckman regressions with sample selection:  
Determinants of the oil or gas hedging decision 
This table reports the coefficients estimates of the Probit model. The dependent variable is the hedging decision dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the oil and gas producer have any oil and gas hedging position for the quarter and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are: TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; LEVERAGE for the 
leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets; CASH_COST is the 
production cost per Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE); BVCD for the book value of convertible debt scaled by the book value 
of total assets. Q_RATIO for the quick ratio measured by the book value of cash and equivalent of cash scaled by the book 
value of current liabilities; RES_OIL and RES_GAS are the quantities of proven reserves for oil (for oil hedgers) and gas 
(for gas hedgers); MKT_VALUE measured by the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (i.e., closing 
price at the end of the quarter multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding); SALES measured by the logarithm 
of sales at the end of the quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 
5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
Variable Oil hedge  Gas hedge  
   
TAX_SAVE 0.9005** 0.1232 
 (0.366) (0.428) 
LEVERAGE 1.5843*** 1.9170*** 
 (0.091) (0.096) 
CASH_COST 0.0398*** 0.0605*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
BVCD -1.2947*** -1.2417*** 
 (0.246) (0.214) 
Q_RATIO -0.1056*** -0.1288*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
RES_(OIL/GAS) -0.0009*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT_VALUE 0.3924*** 0.5700*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
SALES 0.1994*** 0.0894*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
CONSTANT -2.2678*** -2.1663*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) 
   
Observations 5,798 5,798 
Pseudo-R squared 0.3025 0.3129 
Chi-squared 2399.4838 2512.4946 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
